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 Supply chain management involves coordination and collaboration among 
organizations at different echelons of a supply chain. This dissertation explores two 
challenges to supply chain coordination: trade promotion (sales incentive offered by a 
manufacturer to its downstream customers, e.g., distributors or retailers) and bullwhip 
effect (a phenomenon of amplification of demand variability from downstream echelons to 
upstream echelons in the supply chain). Trade promotion represents one of the most 
important elements of the marketing mix and accounts for about 20% of manufacturers’ 
revenue. However, the management of trade promotion remains in a relatively under-
researched state, especially for nongrocery products. This dissertation describes and 
models the effectiveness of trade promotion for healthcare products in a multiechelon 
pharmaceutical supply chain. Trade promotion is identified in the literature as a cause of 
the bullwhip effect, which has long been of interest to both researchers in academia and 
industrial practitioners. This dissertation develops a framework to decompose the 
conventional inter-echelon bullwhip measure into three intra-echelon bullwhips, namely, 
the shipment, manufacturing, and order bullwhips, and explores the empirical relationship 
between the bullwhip and the time duration over which it is measured. This dissertation 
also analyzes the potential bias in aggregated bullwhip measurement and examines various 
driving factors of the bullwhip effect. Theoretical and managerial implications of the 
findings are discussed.    
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There has been an increasing recognition of the importance of supply chain 
management in the past decade. More and more organizations consider supply chain 
management as a core competitive strategy. A supply chain is a set of organizations that 
interact to transform raw materials into finished products and deliver them to customers. 
Each organization in the supply chain is linked by one or more upstream and downstream 
flows of material, information, and finance. The material flow includes the transformation 
and movement of goods and materials. It generally goes from an upstream organization to 
a downstream organization. The information flow involves order transmission and delivery 
status update. The financial flow consists of payment schedules, credits terms, and 
incentive programs. The information and finance flows can move both upstream and 
downstream. Supply chain management is the coordination and integration of these three 
flows both within and among organizations in the supply chain to achieve a sustainable 
competitive advantage. It requires a conscious effort by all supply chain organizations to 
run the supply chain in an efficient way. 
Supply chain performance depends on the actions taken by all organizations in the 
supply chain; one weak link can have a negative effect on every other organization in the 





maximizing the total profit of the supply chain, each organization’s primary objective is to 
maximize its own profit. An action that maximizes one organization’s profit might not 
maximize its upstream supplier’s or downstream customer’s profit. There are incentive 
conflicts among independent organizations in the supply chain. Each organization’s self-
serving behavior can lead to tremendous inefficiencies. Organizations in the supply chain 
can benefit from better alignment of incentives and operational coordination. In this 
dissertation, we study two issues related to supply chain coordination: trade promotion and 
bullwhip effect.  
Trade promotions are special incentive programs offered by manufacturers to their 
supply chain partners (e.g., distributors and retailers). They take various forms such as 
direct price discounts, display allowance, free case offers, off-invoice allowance, volume 
discounts, and slotting allowance. Globally, manufacturers spend more than $500 billion 
on trade promotions every year. In consumer product goods industry, trade spending 
represents about 19% of manufacturers’ revenue compared with advertising’s 7.5% 
(Nielsen, 2014). A recent three-year (2012-2014) industry analysis finds that more than 50% 
of the trade promotion events worldwide did not break even in 2014 (Nielsen, 2015). Trade 
promotion efficiency is rated as the top issue by 99% of manufacturers in the A.C. Nielsen 
2002 Trade Promotion Practice Study. The success of trade promotions is contingent on 
whether manufacturers and their downstream partners can forge a coordinated strategy that 
eliminates forward buying and ineffective spending. Trade promotion management 
remains in a relatively under-researched state (Donthu & Poddar, 2011; Nielsen, 2014). 
One topic that has not yet obtained sufficient attention is about effects of trade promotions 





model the effectiveness of trade promotion for healthcare products, and make a 
contribution to the literature on trade promotions. 
Trade promotion is identified in the literature as a source of the bullwhip effect (Lee 
et al., 1997a; Sodhi, Sodhi, & Tang, 2014). In a seminal paper, Lee et al. (1997a) define the 
bullwhip effect as “the phenomenon where orders to the supplier tend to have larger 
variance than sales to the buyer (i.e., demand distortion), and the distortion propagates 
upstream in an amplified form (i.e., variance amplification)” (p. 546). The bullwhip effect 
is costly to all organizations of the supply chain, but particularly to upstream organizations 
that receive the most distorted order information. The bullwhip effect results from the 
interactions among organizations at different echelons of the supply chain, so an 
organization is not able to mitigate the bullwhip effect by itself. It must recognize the 
underlying causes and try to achieve better coordination with its upstream and downstream 
members. The identification and management of the bullwhip effect is a significant 
advancement in supply chain management in the past two decades. A commonly used 
bullwhip measure in previous studies is the ratio of variability in a firm’s orders placed 
with its supplier to the variability in its demand (the orders the firm receives from its 
customers). While the conventional bullwhip measure is informative and useful for 
determining what happens across a firm in the supply chain, numerous actions inside the 
firm contribute to its conventional bullwhip measure. We develop a framework to 
decompose the conventional bullwhip measure into three intra-echelon bullwhips, namely, 
the shipment, manufacturing, and order bullwhips. This simple and readily-implementable 
framework enables the firm to keep track of its internal bullwhip and to reduce the 





Although there is a growing literature of empirical studies on the bullwhip effect, 
there are several challenges in empirical estimation of the effect. First, theoretical analysis 
uses information-based definition of bullwhip measure, which compares order variance 
with demand variance (Lee et al., 1997a). Most empirical studies employ material-based 
definition, which compares the variance of order receipts with that of sales. These two 
definitions differ in concept and are not necessarily a good approximation of each other. 
Hence, empirical studies on the bullwhip effect using material-based definition may not 
have a direct bearing on the theoretical models that use information-based definition. 
Second, analytical models define the bullwhip effect based on a single product and order 
decision period. Due to data availability issues, most empirical studies measure the 
bullwhip effect based on aggregated products and aggregated time to a month or longer. 
Measuring the bullwhip effect in terms of aggregate data may cause potential biases in 
estimation (Chen & Lee, 2012). Whether aggregation amplifies, preserves, or dampens the 
bullwhip effect is an important question to explore. Third, the bullwhip effect is a supply 
chain phenomenon. Bullwhip effect estimation requires information such as order and 
demand data from each echelon along the supply chain to keep track of individual products. 
It is a formidable task to collect this information. To the best of our knowledge, no prior 
work manages to do this. In this dissertation, we address these empirical challenges by 
analyzing a proprietary dataset from a multiechelon pharmaceutical supply chain and make 
the following contributions to the literature. First, we measure the bullwhip effects based 
on both information flows and material flows, and compare them with each other. Second, 
we explore the impact of product aggregation and temporal aggregation on the bullwhip 





replenishment lead time, and inventory, which have not been fully verified in prior 
empirical literature.  
This dissertation contains three main chapters, with each chapter corresponding to 
a different aspect of trade promotion management and bullwhip effect control. Each 
chapter is independent for the most part and can be read separately. We briefly summarize 
these three chapters below.        
In Chapter 2, we describe and model the effectiveness of trade promotion in a 
multiechelon pharmaceutical supply chain. We analyze how distributors behave when trade 
promotions are offered. We find that distributors heavily forward buy during promotion 
period and seldom pass through promotions to consumers. Overall consumer demand 
associated with the trade promotions doesn’t increase, making trade promotions 
unprofitable for manufacturers. Our results show that the manufacturer does not exhibit a 
bullwhip effect and distributors exhibit the effect for the products that receive trade 
promotions. We observe that the manufacturer and several distributors face sales spikes 
during the final month of a fiscal quarter (hockey stick phenomenon). This sales surge 
together with the bullwhip effect can cause substantial problems in production planning 
and inventory control. We discuss theoretical contributions and managerial implications of 
our findings. 
Researchers exploring the bullwhip effect and its impact on supply chain 
performance utilize the conventional bullwhip measure, that is, the ratio of variance in the 
stream of orders placed to suppliers to variance in demand stream. In Chapter 3, we develop 
a framework to decompose this conventional inter-echelon bullwhip measure into three 





define the shipment bullwhip as the variance in shipments (sales) relative to demand, the 
manufacturing bullwhip as the variance in manufacturing output relative to shipments, and 
the order bullwhip as the variance in orders placed relative to manufacturing. We 
demonstrate that the conventional bullwhip is the product of each of these three intra-
echelon bullwhips. Moreover, using monthly, industry-level U.S. Census Bureau data, we 
characterize the magnitude of these intra-echelon bullwhips across industries, examine 
correlations between them, and identify factors that may be associated with industry 
differences. We also explore the empirical relationship between the bullwhip and the time 
duration over which it is measured (e.g., quarterly versus monthly) along with the impact 
of the time period’s start date. For example, our data suggest a quarterly start date of 
February 1 yields a higher bullwhip measure than does a January 1 start date. Importantly, 
the decomposition framework provides guidance to firms seeking to better manage their 
shipping, manufacturing, and ordering activities. 
In Chapter 4, we investigate the bullwhip effect in a multiechelon pharmaceutical 
supply chain. Specifically, we estimate the bullwhip effect at the stock keeping unit (SKU) 
level, analyze the bias in aggregated measurement of the bullwhip effect, and examine 
various driving factors of the bullwhip effect. We find that both manufacturer and 
distributors exhibit an intensive bullwhip effect, but the bullwhip effect at the manufacturer 
is less severe than that at distributors. Furthermore, we observe increasing demand 
variability from distributors to manufacturer. The bullwhip measurement based on orders 
(information flow) is larger than that based on order receipts (material flow). Data 
aggregation across products or over long time periods tends to mask the bullwhip effect in 





bullwhip effect, and that price variation, replenishment lead time, and inventory are three 







TRADE PROMOTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Trade promotions are special incentive programs offered by manufacturers to 
distributors/retailers. They take various forms such as direct price discounts, display 
allowance, volume discounts, and bonus case offers. In this chapter, trade promotions are 
referred to as temporary price discounts. Dreze and Bell (2003) report that the U.S. 
consumer packaged goods industry spends approximately $75 billion annually on trade 
promotions. The large magnitude of this number becomes more obvious when compared 
with the total money spent on advertising that is approximately $37 billion. According to 
Ailawadi et al. (1999), trade promotions overall account for 52% of the total money spent 
on advertising and promotion. They represent a significant percentage of the marketing 
mix budget. However, trade promotions remain under-researched (Donthu & Poddar, 2011). 
One topic that has not yet obtained sufficient attention is the effect of trade promotions for 
nongrocery products (van Heerde & Neslin, 2008). By using a proprietary dataset in the 
healthcare industry, we fill the gap and make a contribution to the literature on trade 
promotions. 
Manufacturers offer trade promotions with the hope that distributors will pass 





price discounts offered by the manufacturers in three ways: first, they will purchase 
products from manufacturers who offer discounts instead of competing manufacturers who 
do not; second, they may forward buy, that is, order more products from the manufacturers 
than they need to meet current demand and hold inventory; third, they may pass through 
the discounts to customers in some form of distributor promotions. In any case, we expect 
to see a larger order during manufacturer promotion period. Manufacturers are very 
concerned about distributors’ behavior during sales promotion. If the distributors just 
forward buy and do not pass through promotions, or pass through only a small part of the 
promotions, what manufacturers achieve is to sell more units at a lower price. These units 
could have been sold at regular price in the near future. Therefore, manufacturers do not 
benefit from promotions. Trade promotion efficiency is rated as the top issue by 99% of 
manufacturers in the A.C. Nielsen 2002 Trade Promotion Practice Study. This chapter 
explicitly examines how distributors respond to price discounts and provides insights for 
manufacturers. 
In the past two decades, a significant advancement in supply chain management is 
the identification and management of the bullwhip effect. In a seminal paper, Lee et al. 
(1997a) define the bullwhip effect as “the phenomenon where orders to the supplier tend 
to have larger variance than sales to the buyer (i.e., demand distortion), and the distortion 
propagates upstream in an amplified form (i.e., variance amplification)” (p. 546). The 
mismatch between demand and production leads to supply chain inefficiency. Lee et al. 
(1997a) identify trade promotion as a source of the bullwhip effect. Most theoretical studies 
on bullwhip effect analyze this effect in a single product model setting, but most empirical 





bullwhip effect in terms of aggregate data causes potential biases (e.g., Chen & Lee, 2012; 
Jin et al., 2015b). In contrast, we report the tests of the bullwhip effect in a supply chain at 
the product level and in fine time buckets such as monthly as defined in analytical papers. 
So our results avoid aggregation biases and therefore make important contributions to the 
literature.  
One issue directly related to trade promotion or distributor promotion is promotion 
timing. In practice, manufacturers and/or distributors often offer promotions at the end of 
sales period in order to reach sales targets. In the literature, the resulting last-period sales 
spike is referred to as the hockey stick phenomenon. Hockey stick sales pattern is one of 
the most harmful problems in the supply chain management and contributes to triggering 
the bullwhip effect (Singer et al., 2009). Graham et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006) 
find that managers select operational activities (e.g., offering price discounts at the end of 
the quarter) that sacrifice long-time value to manipulate earnings to meet earnings 
benchmarks. Earnings management may mislead some shareholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the firm (Healy & Wahlen, 2009). One goal of this chapter is to 
document hockey stick phenomenon in recent firm/product-level data from a proprietary 
dataset in the healthcare industry. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief survey 
on the related literature. Research objectives are stated in section 2.3. Section 2.4 
summarizes empirical context and data. In section 2.5, we discuss the econometric models 







2.2 Literature Review 
There are three streams of literature related to our study: trade promotions, bullwhip 
effect, and hockey stick phenomenon. There is a huge body of literature on trade 
promotions. Interested readers are referred to comprehensive reviews by Blattberg et al. 
(1995), Raju (1995), and Donthu and Poddar (2011). We only discuss the papers that are 
relevant to our study. Researchers attempt to measure the profit impact of trade dollars 
(Mohr & Low, 1993) and have long questioned whether trade promotions are profitable to 
the manufacturer (Chevalier & Curhan, 1976; Kruger, 1987; Lucas, 1996). Kopp and 
Greyser (1987) and Quelch (1983) investigate both the long- and short-term impacts of 
trade promotions. Manufacturers blame retailers for taking advantage of trade promotions 
but not providing benefits to end consumers (Chevalier & Curhan, 1976), which would 
increase the profits of only the retailers at the expense of manufacturers. Coughlan et al. 
(2006) and Kotler and Keller (2006) argue that retailer’s forward buying is a consequence 
of trade promotions, which helps the retailer but hurts the manufacturer. Desai et al. (2010) 
show that the retailer in a bilateral monopoly model will forward buy when trade promotion 
is offered by the manufacturer. Retailers admit that they use trade promotions to shore up 
their profits (Kumar et al., 2001). Abraham and Lodish (1990) find that only 16% of trade 
promotion deals are profitable for the manufacturer based on incremental sales through 
retailer warehouses compared to the manufacturers’ allowances, lost margin, and cost of 
discounts. Overall, trade promotions appear to be a losing proposition for manufacturers. 
Our findings in this chapter are consistent with this conclusion. In a seminal paper, 
Blattberg and Levin (1987) present an integrated model to describe the interrelationships 





equations: retailer orders as a function of inventory and trade promotion, and consumer 
sales as a function of retailer promotion. By using Nielsen bimonthly data on manufacturer 
shipments, retail sales, and information on trade deals and advertising, they estimate the 
effectiveness and profitability of trade promotions. In terms of conceptual modelling 
structure, our econometric model is similar to theirs. We come up with a more complex 
model, use alternative proxy variables, and estimate the model using advanced techniques. 
The difference is that we get more accurate estimates. Also our dataset contains more 
detailed information (e.g., monthly sales numbers) that is not available to Blattberg and 
Levin, eliminating many of the data problems they encounter. For example, there is no need 
to develop monthly sales numbers from bimonthly sales using linear extrapolation. 
 Bullwhip effect has been widely studied in economics and operations management 
literature since Forrester (1961) first identified the effect in a series of case studies. 
Economists discuss supply chain volatility in terms of production smoothing. A firm can 
use inventory as a buffer to smooth its production in response to demand fluctuations. 
Maintaining production at a relatively stable level is less costly than varying the production 
level, possibly either because the production cost function is convex or because changing 
the rate of production is expensive. Production smoothing enables the firm to exploit 
economies in production and maximize total profits. This argument suggests that 
production is less volatile than demand. However, the majority of the empirical studies 
show the opposite result: production is more variable than demand (e.g., Blanchard, 1983; 
Miron & Zeldes, 1988; Rossana, 1998). To explain the discrepancies, several researchers 
(e.g., Caplin, 1985; Blinder, 1986; Kahn, 1987) have shown that production is actually 





al. (1997a) approach the bullwhip phenomenon from a managerial perspective as opposed 
to a macroeconomics aspect and popularize the term in the operations management 
literature. In a seminal paper (1997a), these same authors define the bullwhip effect in 
supply chain context and analyze four sources of the effect: demand signal processing, 
price fluctuation, order batching, and rationing game. There is a growing operations 
management literature of the analytical studies on the bullwhip effect after the work of Lee 
et al. (1997a) (e.g., Cachon, 1999; Chen et al., 2000; Gilbert, 2005; Chen & Lee, 2012). 
Many researchers from operations management field have conducted empirical 
investigation on the bullwhip effect. Anderson et al. (2000) and Terwiesch et al. (2005) 
report the existence of the bullwhip effect in machine tool industry and semiconductor 
supply chain, respectively. Fransoo and Wouters (2000) discuss several important issues in 
measuring the bullwhip effect, and find that the bullwhip effect exists at different echelons 
in two food supply chains in the Netherlands. By using monthly data on 3,754 SKUs from 
the distribution center of a supermarket chain in Spain, Lai (2005) finds that 80% of the 
total SKUs show bullwhip effect and order batching is the main cause. Cachon et al. (2007) 
use monthly sales and inventory data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis to search for the bullwhip effect in a wide panel of industries. They 
find that retail industries and most manufacturing industries do not exhibit a bullwhip effect, 
but wholesale industries exhibit the effect. Our results at the product level are consistent 
with those at the industry level by Cachon et al. (2007). By using firm-level quarterly data 
from Compustat, Bray and Mendelson (2012) find that two thirds of 4,689 public U.S. 
companies bullwhip and information transmission lead time contributes to the effect.         





been reported in the literature by several researchers. Sterman (1992) shows that even 
though automobile manufacturers demand the parts at a constant pace for their assembly 
lines, the orders placed to suppliers at the end of each month exceed many times the orders 
placed during the month. Hammond (1994) reports a similar situation for Barilla SpA, the 
largest pasta manufacturer in Italy. While pasta consumption is relatively constant, the 
order pattern of one of its wholesalers has peaks at the end of each month. Bradley and 
Arntzen (1999) report this situation for an electronics manufacturer at the end of each 
quarter, and describe it as a self-induced pattern driven by the company’s business practices 
and by customers who have learned to watch for end-of-quarter deals. Our findings provide 
some evidence for hockey stick phenomenon in healthcare industry. Theoretical models 
that have been employed to study this phenomenon are based on noncooperative game 
theory (Singer et al., 2009), agency theory (Chen, 2000), and dynamic stochastic models 
(Sohoni et al., 2010). Hockey stick phenomenon is associated with other effects in the 
accounting and economics literature such as channel stuffing, sales manipulation, forward 
selling, earnings management, and fiscal year end effect (Chapman & Steenburgh, 2011; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Lai et al., 2011). Oyer (1998) shows the fiscal year end sales pattern: 
sales at the industry level of a large panel of manufacturing firms are 2.7% higher in the 
fourth fiscal quarter and 4.8% lower in the first fiscal quarter than they are in the second or 
third quarter. Oyer discusses how managerial incentives may cause the observed fiscal year 
end effects. Our econometric modelling approach is closely related to the pioneering work 







2.3 Research Objectives 
 The primary objective of this chapter is to explore how downstream members in a 
three-echelon supply chain respond to manufacturer’s price discounts. Figure 2.1 shows 
factors that influence the offering of discounts and the response to the discounts. We discuss 
these factors below from the perspective of manufacturer, distributor, and practitioner, 
respectively.  
The Manufacturer’s Perspective: The main reason that a manufacturer offers a 
discount is to increase sales volume. The willingness of a manufacturer to run trade 
promotions depends on several factors. The first one is inventory. When a manufacturer is 
burdened with excess inventory, there are many financial drawbacks such as increased 
holding cost, reduced profits, and adverse impact on cash flow. The manufacturer can use 
promotions to liquidate excess inventory and shift inventory holding cost to the distributors 
(Cui et al., 2008). The more inventory the manufacturer holds, the more likely it offers 
discounts. Inventory positively affects the manufacturer’s offering of a discount. The 
second factor is financial report’s timing (end of the fiscal quarter). Managers may take 
various actions (e.g., temporary price reductions) to boost sales prior to the end of the fiscal 
quarter to meet sales target or earnings benchmarks. Graham et al. (2005) find that 78% of 
400 managers surveyed admit to take economic actions that sacrifice long-term value to 
manage earnings. Roychowdhury (2006) find that managers choose operational activities 
to manipulate earnings to meet earnings thresholds, so promotions have a positive 
relationship with the fiscal quarter end. We expect to see that sales are higher at the end of 
the fiscal quarter (hockey stick phenomenon). The third factor is capacity utilization. Low 





indicates that there is a lack of market demand and portrays a negative image of 
management. When experiencing low capacity utilization, the manufacturer will be more 
likely to offer promotions to stimulate demand in order to keep the utilization at the 
appropriate level. Promotions have a negative association with capacity utilization.          
The Distributor’s Perspective: The distributor responds to promotions in three ways. 
First, the distributor will purchase from manufactures who provide promotions rather than 
from competing manufacturers who do not. This affects manufacturers’ market share: 
Market share of manufacturers who offer discounts increases, and that of those who do not 
decreases. Second, since the purpose of the trade promotion is to get the distributor to offer 
the practitioners a price discount and therefore increase sales, the distributor will pass 
through (some) promotions and increase its inventories in anticipation of increased sales 
to practitioners. Third, the distributor will forward buy and hold inventory in order to take 
advantage of the discounts and save purchasing cost. Forward buying benefits the 
distributor at the expense of the manufacturer: The distributor buys at reduced costs, but 
the manufacturer has a lower sales revenue because there is no overall increase in 
practitioner demand to compensate for the discounted price. In any of three cases 
aforementioned, trade promotions increase orders placed by the distributor. When a 
distributor decides how much to order in each period to meet demand for its products, 
inventory on hand must be taken into account. Higher inventory level causes the distributor 
to order less to avoid additional holding cost. The distributor evaluates trade-off between 
savings from the promotion and extra inventory costs. The distributor’s inventory 
negatively affects its response to the discount. As in the manufacturer’s case, the 





fiscal quarter end. The distributor’s inventory positively affects the distributor’s own 
offering of a discount, as does the distributor’s own fiscal quarter end.  
The Practitioner’s Perspective: When distributors pass through trade promotions to 
the practitioners or offer practitioners their own promotions, the practitioners react in the 
following three ways: First, they purchase from distributors who provide discounts rather 
than from those who do not. This causes distributors’ market share to shift. Second, the 
practitioners may purchase more units than usual and consume them at a higher rate. 
Consumption responds to promotions because promotions have the ability to increase 
practitioners’ inventory level. Higher inventory levels mean fewer stockouts. The 
practitioners have more chances to consume the product. Both behavioral and economic 
theory provide supporting evidence that high inventory can increase usage rate (Ailawadi 
& Neslin, 1998). Third, the practitioners may forward buy. As in the distributor’s case, the 
practitioner’s inventory negatively affects its response to the distributor’s discount.     
The second objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact of trade promotions. 
Trade promotion is identified as a cause of the bullwhip effect (Lee et al. 1997a). We 
empirically test whether the bullwhip effect exists. If so, how severe is the effect? We also 
calculate the financial cost of the bullwhip effect. Following the original definition of the 
bullwhip effect by Lee et al. (1997a), we define 
 




where 𝑉[ ] is the variance operator. The numerator and denominator are the variance of 
order series and demand series of a single product. Order can be interpreted as production 
in manufacturing setting. We say that the bullwhip effect is exhibited by a product when 





bullwhip effect, we expect that bullwhip ratio is greater than 1 for products that receive 
promotions.  
 
2.4 Empirical Context and Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on a proprietary dataset in the healthcare industry. 
The dataset consists of one manufacturer and six nation-wide distributors (A-F). The 
structure of the supply chain and of the data is shown in Figure 2.2. The manufacturer 
produces consumable products that all medical practitioners in this specialty use, and has 
a lion’s share of the market. These products are applied to patients in medical practitioner’s 
office and have a shelf life of approximately 18 months. The manufacturer may periodically 
offer price discounts to its distributors to meet sales targets, for example, at the end of the 
manufacturer’s fiscal quarter. In turn, a distributor may pass through some of the discounts 
to its customers. Also the distributor may offer its own promotions to meet sales targets at 
the end of its fiscal quarter.    
We collect monthly data on 31 stock keeping units (SKUs) over the period between 
January 2010 and June 2014. The frequency of the data (monthly) matches the frequency 
of decisions by the manufacturer and distributors, so the data do not have the “time-
disaggregation bias” identified by Kahn (1992), and are suitable for appropriate supply 
chain cost assessment (Chen & Lee, 2012). The entire product category is made up of these 
31 SKUs. Specifically, the following data are used to perform empirical analysis: 
manufacturer’s production, manufacturer’s sales (shipments to distributors), distributors’ 
orders, distributors’ sales, manufacturer’s wholesale price, and manufacturer’s price 





price variables used in our study. SKUs 1-11 are carried by all distributors. SKUs 12-15, 
16-19, 20-23, 24-26, 27-28, and 29-31 are carried only by distributors A-F, respectively. 
Manufacturer offers price discounts for 2 SKUs (SKUs 1 and 2), which account for 40% 
of the total sales. All 31 SKUs have annual wholesale price increase. Quantities are 
expressed in physical units rather than dollar amounts. This avoids measurement and 
accounting problems associated with inventory evaluation (Lai, 2005). Over the entire 
sample period, manufacturer offers ten discounts, five discounts, four discounts, four 
discounts, five discounts, and six discounts to distributors A-F, respectively. Among these 
thirty-four discounts, twenty-five occur at the end of manufacturer’s fiscal quarter.  
We do not have access to distributors’ inventory data, so an estimate of inventories 
is made using the following relationship:  
 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 −  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 (2.2) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡 denotes the net inventories at the end of period 𝑡. We use shipments 
received from manufacturer as a proxy for distributor’s production. Since initial inventories 
are not available, we choose them so that each period’s inventory is greater than or equal 
to zero. Thus, the inventory data used in model estimation are relative inventory. Blattberg 
and Levin (1987) use the same approach to set the starting inventory.  
Figure 2.3 shows sales and orders of a distributor for a specific product. We observe 
that there are usually troughs in orders after a price discount ends, suggesting forward 
buying on the part of the distributor during the promotional period. If the distributor passes 
promotions on to practitioners, the sales pattern and order pattern will be close to each 
other. In Figure 2.3, the sales of the distributor have much less variability than the orders 





only some portion of the promotions on to practitioners. Figure 2.4 shows the total sales of 
a distributor. We see spikes towards the end of every quarter. Hockey stick phenomenon is 
prevalent.  
 
2.5 Model Specification 
In order to explore the impact of trade promotions and identify the presence or 
absence of the hockey stick effect, we propose four empirical models and describe them in 
detail below. Recall that manufacturer provides price discounts only for SKUs 1 and 2, 
which carried by all distributors, and some of the other 29 SKUs are not carried by every 
distributor. We analyze SKUs 1 and 2 separately from the remaining 29 SKUs. Specifically, 
Models I(a), I(b), and III apply to SKUs 1 and 2, and Models II and IV apply to SKUs 3-
31. 
 
2.5.1 Distributor Order Model 
We regress the distributors’ orders on explanatory variables with the following 
specification (Model I(a)) for SKUs 1 and 2: 
 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
 + 𝛿𝑖(𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)𝑖𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2.3) 
where 𝑖 and 𝑡 refer to distributor and time, respectively. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the orders placed by 
distributor 𝑖 in month 𝑡 to the manufacturer. 𝛼𝑖 is the time-invariant distributor-specific 
fixed effect for distributor 𝑖. 𝑡 is a linear time trend. That is, 𝑡 is 1 in the first month, 2 in 
the second month, and up to 54 in the last month. Manufacturer increases wholesale price 





out the price change notice 60 days before effective date and then distributors will react 
accordingly. For example, if the manufacturer plans for a January price increase, 
distributors may make a purchase in December, depending on how big the price increase 
is. A price increase is often preceded by an increase in orders. This can be modeled by 
having a dummy variable for the periods prior to the price increase times the percentage 
price changes. More specifically, if there is a 10% wholesale price increase for distributor 
𝑖 in July, 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 will be 0 for July and 10% for May and June. To represent the 
magnitude of a promotion, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a percentage dollar discount for distributor 𝑖 in 
month 𝑡. This percentage discount makes various trade promotions comparable over time. 
Since trade promotions increase orders, we expect 𝛾𝑖  to be positive. 
(𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)𝑖𝑡  is one period lagged inventory for distributor 𝑖  in month 𝑡 . 
Distributors usually use some form of inventory model to determine how much to order on 
a given promotion. We include lagged inventories in the model because last period’s 
inventories influence the quantity to order in the present period. Inventories inversely affect 
orders, so 𝛿𝑖 is expected to have a negative sign. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the error term, which account 
for all of the order fluctuations that we cannot explain.   
In order to demonstrate the robustness of the results from Model I(a), we estimate 
the alternative model specification for each distributor and product combination (Model 
I(b)): 
 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 = α +  𝛽1𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡  +  γ𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 
 + δ(𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡 
(2.4) 
Since not every distributor carries SKUs 3-31, we analyze each distributor and 





 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 = α +  𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡  +  𝛿(𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)𝑡 
                       + 𝜀𝑡 
(2.5) 
 
2.5.2 Distributor Sales Model 
We perform regression analysis on distributors’ sales using the following linear 
specification (Model III) for SKUs 1 and 2: 
 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛿𝑖(𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑)𝑖𝑡 
                         + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2.6) 
where 𝑖 and 𝑡 refer to distributor and time, respectively. 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the sales of distributor 𝑖 
to practitioners in month 𝑡. 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 is exactly the same as in Model I(a). Since we do 
not know distributors’ pricing information, we use manufacturer’s annual wholesale price 
increase as a proxy for distributor’s wholesale price change. (𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑)𝑖𝑡  is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the sales occur at the last month of a fiscal quarter and zero 
otherwise. We assume that the fiscal effects are the same in the first and second months of 
a fiscal quarter and use these as the base months. 𝛿𝑖  measures the amount by which 
distributor 𝑖’s unit sales change, holding other factors constant, from the first two months 
of a fiscal quarter to the third one. If hockey stick phenomenon exists, 𝛿𝑖 is expected to 
have a positive sign.   
Ideally, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a percentage dollar discount offered by distributor 𝑖 in month 
𝑡 . Given that we do not collect information about distributor promotions, we use 
manufacturer promotions as a surrogate for distributor promotions. Since discounts may 
increase sales, 𝛾𝑖 is expected to have a positive sign.     





for each distributor and product combination (Model IV):    
 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡  + 𝛿(𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.7) 
The data used in analysis are stationary because the Dickey-Fuller test suggests that 
there is no unit root in each data series. Since our data contain observations across 
distributors and months, it is likely that the variance of errors varies across distributors and 
errors for different observations are correlated within a distributor. We estimate Models I(a) 
and III by fixed effect (FE) method with cluster-robust standard errors that are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation (see Wooldridge, 2010, Chapter 
10). We estimate Models I(b), II, and IV by ordinary least squares (OLS) with Newey-West 
standard errors (see Greene, 2008, Chapter 19). The error structure is assumed to be 
heteroskedastic and AR(1) autocorrelated.  
 
2.6 Results 
In Tables 2.2 and 2.3, we report estimates of Models I(a) and I(b). Among these two 
models, the coefficients on 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 for distributors A, B, E, and F are positive and 
statistically significant across products, indicating that distributors A, B, E, and F place a 
significantly larger order during promotional period. While these distributors seem to 
behave consistently with distributors described in previous literature (i.e., wholesaler or 
retailer increases its orders placed to the manufacturer when a trade promotion is offered 
(e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2004)), other distributors do not. Specifically, the coefficients on 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 for distributors C and D have varying signs and different levels of significance 
across models. Clearly, not all distributors respond to the price discounts. The coefficients 





products in two models, indicating that higher inventory level is associated with lower 
order quantity. This is consistent with our expectation: Inventory inversely affects order. 
Estimates of Model II are shown in Table 2.4. The coefficients on 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 are 
positive and statistically significant for almost all products carried by distributor A, but not 
for products carried by other distributors. Only distributor A responds to wholesale price 
increase. In general, the coefficients on 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 are negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that inventory is negatively associated with orders.     
Table 2.5 shows estimates of Model III. Columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) are for SKU 1 
and SKU 2, respectively. In columns (1) and (4), the coefficients on 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 are positive 
and statistically significant for distributor F, indicating that distributor F has significantly 
higher sales for SKUs 1 and 2 during manufacturer promotion period. This implies that 
distributor F passes through trade promotions to practitioners. But we do not know the 
pass-through rate. Orders placed by practitioners to distributors and shipments from 
distributors to practitioners may occur in different months. Given that we only have 
shipments data, it is likely that some distributors pass through trade promotions, but the 
shipments occur in the next month rather than in the same month as manufacturer 
promotions. In columns (2) and (5), we use one period lagged discount variable. The 
coefficients on this variable are positive and statistically significant for distributors A and 
B. These two distributors have significantly higher sales for SKUs 1 and 2 one month later 
after manufacturer promotions. This implies that distributors A and B probably pass 
through trade promotions. In columns (3) and (6), we use lagged discount for distributors 
A and B, and use discount for the remaining distributors. The results show that distributors 





coefficients on 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 are positive and statistically significant for distributors B, C, 
D, E, and F. The hockey stick effect exists at most distributors. If we compare the 
coefficients on 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 for distributors A, B, E, and F in Model I(a) with those in Model 
III, we find that the magnitude of the coefficients in Model I(a) is much larger than that in 
Model III, indicating that most of the incremental units sold by the manufacturer during 
promotion period are not the incremental units sold by distributors. Distributors A, B, E, 
and F forward buy and build inventories at lower costs when trade promotions occur. The 
distributors pocket the discount promotions without passing the benefits to the practitioners 
or with passing through a small part of the benefits. This result is consistent with the 
findings in the literature that trade promotions are not profitable for manufacturers (e.g., 
Abraham & Lodish, 1990).             
Parameter estimates of Model IV are reported in Table 2.6. The coefficients on 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 are positive and statistically significant for 10 out of 13 products carried by 
distributor B and 7 out of 12 products carried by distributor D. The coefficients on 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 are positive but not significant for the remaining 5 products carried by 
distributor D. These results indicate that distributors B and D have higher sales in the last 
month of a fiscal quarter than they do in the first two months.            
 In Table 2.7, we report the bullwhip ratios. The bullwhip ratio for the manufacturer 
is equal to variance in production stream divided by variance in demand stream. Since we 
do not have distributors’ demand data, we use sales as a proxy for demand. This will not 
inflate bullwhip estimates because distributors in our dataset usually carry enough 
inventory and stockouts rarely occur. The bullwhip ratio for distributors is equal to variance 





bullwhip effect exists at each distributor. The average ratio is 49.81 (ranging from 3.85 to 
216.97), much higher than those reported in the previous literature. However, the bullwhip 
effect is not exhibited by manufacturer, indicating that the manufacturer makes production 
smoother than demand. This result is aligned well with production smoothing hypothesis. 
Our findings are consistent with those obtained by Cachon et al. (2007) at industry level.      
 Many firms use market share as a key indicator of their relative success in market 
competitiveness. From the information we collect from several distributors, we know that 
the distribution of health care products is highly competitive and these distributors actually 
compete with each other. The product category in our dataset is mature and the primary 
demand doesn’t increase over sample periods. If a distributor passes through trade 
promotions to practitioners or boosts sales at the quarter end, its market share will increase. 
Table 2.8 presents the correlation coefficients between distributors’ market share and trade 
promotion. There is a significant positive association between market share of distributors 
B and F and manufacturer’s discounts for SKUs 1 and 2. This implies that distributors B 
and F probably pass through trade promotions. The result is consistent with that from 
Model III. In Table 2.9, we report the correlation coefficients between distributors’ market 
share and their fiscal quarter ends. Market share of distributors B, D, and F has a 
significantly positive relationship with fiscal quarter ends for SKUs 1 and 2. This result is 
consistent with the hockey stick effect identified in Model III.                
 Trade promotions cause forwarding buying, which inflates inventories and 
therefore raises certain costs. We seek to estimate the added inventory costs resulting from 
promotions for manufacturer and distributors. In order to do this, we need to compare the 





no promotion. When calculating the hypothetical inventory, we assume that manufacturer 
and distributors implement base stock inventory model (also called the order-up-to model) 
and maintain 99% service level. From our interviews with management of the manufacturer 
and public information of several distributors, we think these assumptions are reasonable 
approximations to real life situations. By using the analytical model developed by 
Moinzadeh (1997), we estimate that the carrying costs on inventories that include storage, 
insurance, handling, and capital charges are about 15% per year. We use Model III to 
forecast what the distributors’ sales would have been in the absence of the discounts. Then 
we calculate the hypothetical inventory level at distributors and manufacturer. Table 2.10 
shows the yearly added costs caused by promotions. The cost to the manufacturer is over 
one million dollars and represents 3.21% of total sales of the products affected. The costs 
to several distributors represent more than 1% of total sales. The cost to the supply chain 
is about two million dollars. Moreover, these substantial amounts account for only a part 
of the total costs of trade promotions. We do not try to quantify other expenses such as 
higher administrative and selling costs to operate increasingly complex procurement and 
sales programs, the costs of the time spent on design and evaluation of trade deals, and 
higher production costs due to uneven scheduling. These costs of promotions may equal or 
exceed the costs that we have estimated. Trade promotions incur high costs for both 
manufacturer and distributors and impair the efficiency of the supply chain.      
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Trade promotions are the most important promotional tool for manufacturers. It is 





spending accounts for 16% of gross sales. Conventional wisdom in marketing holds that 
(1) trade promotions are the main culprit behind retailer forwarding buying and (2) 
manufacturers are hurt by forward buying. Our results are consistent with this wisdom. By 
using a proprietary dataset in the healthcare industry, we find that some distributors do 
forward buy when offered wholesale price discounts and pass through only a small part of 
discounts to practitioners, causing trade promotions not to pay for manufacturers. Given 
the huge expenditure on trade promotions, we encourage marketing managers to re-
examine the components of their promotion programs. In fact, our discussions with 
managers of the manufacturer reveal that they are suspicious of the effectiveness of 
periodic discounts and plan to implement a new pricing scheme that excludes the discounts. 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first empirical study on the effects of trade 
promotions for health care products.  
We observe hockey stick phenomenon at the manufacturer and several distributors. 
The resulting sales surge causes substantial difficulty in production planning, 
transportation, and inventory management. Both trade promotion and hockey stick 
phenomenon contribute to triggering the bullwhip effect, which is one of the most harmful 
problems in the supply chain management. We find that all distributors exhibit an intensive 
bullwhip effect, lowering supply chain efficiency. One leading cause of the hockey stick 
phenomenon is salesperson and executive compensation contracts, which induce these 
agents to manipulate prices and influence the timing of sales. Our results provide practicing 
managers with a good starting point to think about their incentive schemes.        
 Since there are only two products in our dataset that receive price discounts, this 





information about distributor promotions, so we have to use an alternative variable as a 
measure of distributor activity. The availability of distributor promotion data in the future 








Note: “+” and “–” denote positive and negative effects, respectively. 






















































Table 2.1:  Summary Statistics of the Orders, Sales, and Price Variables 





Sales 9699 20431 2 88510 
Orders 13179 41712 -7 411240 
Distributor B 
Sales 5104 10038 8 43999 
Orders 6321 14241 -22 104860 
Distributor C 
Sales 1969 4781 1 31207 
Orders 2706 6339 -20 63240 
Distributor D 
Sales 2289 4187 -3 16992 
Orders 2969 6534 -225 53000 
Distributor E 
Sales 838 1437 1 5903 
Orders 2055 3592 -13 20800 
Distributor F 
Sales 2008 3556 -160 18660 
Orders 2562 5201 20 45000 
Discount 5.46% 0.02 4.00% 8.60% 
Wholesale price % change 5.70% 0.03 1.01% 10.10% 




















Table 2.2:  Estimates of Model I(a) 
 (1) (2) 
 SKU1 SKU2 
wholesale_a 327.7*** 3,274*** 
 (0.286) (15.30) 
wholesale_b 352.3*** 1,866*** 
 (1.357) (16.35) 
wholesale_c 10.98 67.72*** 
 (7.323) (7.258) 
wholesale_d 347.3*** 804.5*** 
 (0.422) (16.81) 
wholesale_e 37.85*** 210.6*** 
 (0.349) (5.246) 
wholesale_f 94.87*** 367.3*** 
 (4.250) (12.03) 
discount_a 1,712*** 11,837*** 
 (7.959) (44.44) 
discount_b 1,149*** 7,143*** 
 (8.840) (72.69) 
discount_c 24.46** -263.0*** 
 (6.676) (56.50) 
discount_d 134.9*** 636.8*** 
 (10.88) (32.03) 
discount_e 150.1*** 664.0*** 
 (3.285) (18.73) 
discount_f 525.1*** 2,613*** 
 (1.730) (6.555) 
lagged_inv_a -0.483*** -0.407*** 
 (0.00979) (0.00558) 
lagged_inv_b -0.335*** -0.384*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0150) 
lagged_inv_c -0.278** -0.119*** 
 (0.0910) (0.0142) 
lagged_inv_d -0.185*** -0.178*** 
 (0.00396) (0.0408) 
lagged_inv_e -0.768*** -0.710*** 
 (0.148) (0.139) 
lagged_inv_f -0.433*** -0.539*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0162) 
linear_trend 19.64 18.26 
 (14.36) (79.60) 
Constant 2,887*** 21,861*** 
 (260.5) (1,976) 
Observations 324 324 





Table 2.2 Continued 
 (1) (2) 
 SKU1 SKU2 
Number of distributor 6 6 
Distributor FE Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 2.3:  Estimates of Model I(b) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SKU1_A SKU2_A SKU1_B SKU2_B SKU1_C SKU2_C 
wholesale 328.9 3,202 350.0* 1,898 20.82 60.90 
 (517.1) (4,193) (207.4) (1,365) (50.62) (207.7) 
discount 1,745*** 12,046*** 1,163*** 6,998*** 15.49 -316.1 
 (526.9) (4,212) (205.0) (1,361) (16.63) (286.6) 
lagged_inv -0.524*** -0.434*** -0.402*** -0.354*** -0.155** -0.132** 
 (0.151) (0.125) (0.136) (0.115) (0.0624) (0.0517) 
linear_trend 79.28 393.7 43.86 -140.1 0.355 -56.53** 
 (62.94) (419.3) (27.33) (120.2) (5.907) (24.79) 
Constant 6,369*** 49,699*** 5,719*** 40,484*** 998.7*** 7,141*** 
 (1,194) (10,680) (937.0) (7,622) (144.8) (932.6) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.406 0.413 0.388 0.369 0.081 0.230 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses 

















Table 2.3 Continued 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 SKU1_D SKU2_D SKU1_E SKU2_E SKU1_F SKU2_F 
wholesale 346.6** 782.2** 37.66 209.2 100.5 374.8 
 (167.5) (386.4) (23.88) (137.9) (109.9) (902.2) 
discount 116.7 594.3 151.9** 659.0** 522.8*** 2,609*** 
 (147.6) (955.8) (72.82) (289.6) (66.54) (616.7) 
lagged_inv -0.192*** -0.232** -0.687*** -0.747*** -0.394*** -0.529*** 
 (0.0508) (0.104) (0.121) (0.111) (0.114) (0.142) 
linear_trend -4.401 -87.52 11.81*** 39.55* 0.599 -31.67 
 (9.922) (57.31) (3.839) (20.59) (8.385) (53.86) 
Constant 1,712*** 13,867*** 827.5*** 4,934*** 1,906*** 16,257*** 
 (408.0) (2,552) (191.4) (1,068) (341.3) (3,016) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.303 0.150 0.399 0.392 0.547 0.487 
 
 
Table 2.4:  Estimates of Model II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






SKU 7_ A SKU 8_ 
A 
wholesale 9.968 8.788 38.48 39.25*** 102.6*** 14.26*** 
 (11.37) (11.23) (23.04) (11.20) (27.77) (3.955) 
lagged_inv -0.172 -0.319** -0.112 -0.212*** -0.222*** -0.210*** 
 (0.140) (0.143) (0.122) (0.0566) (0.0344) (0.0601) 
linear_trend -1.921 -3.311** -10.60** 1.179 0.754 -0.381 
 (1.198) (1.411) (4.966) (0.902) (1.796) (0.402) 
Constant 176.3*** 246.6*** 554.3** 109.8*** 335.6*** 71.79*** 
 (43.73) (50.36) (253.0) (36.00) (61.30) (11.16) 
Observations 36 36 36 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.131 0.193 0.266 0.453 0.517 0.462 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 









Table 2.4 Continued 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 






SKU 12 SKU 13 SKU 14 
wholesale 359.6*** 57.69** 3.813 212.8*** 1,241*** 447.6*** 
 (101.6) (21.96) (19.82) (67.55) (411.8) (127.6) 
lagged_inv -0.244*** -0.0699 0.640 -0.392** -0.458*** -0.330*** 
 (0.0547) (0.0587) (0.520) (0.180) (0.0996) (0.0707) 
linear_trend 13.24 -1.391 -22.82 2.179 38.84 18.71 
 (9.518) (2.868) (15.25) (6.035) (27.62) (14.61) 
Constant 1,197*** 358.4** 262.7 1,593*** 6,940*** 2,631*** 
 (244.0) (144.2) (171.2) (448.7) (1,129) (457.4) 
Observations 54 54 30 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.479 0.177 0.144 0.416 0.432 0.476 
 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 SKU 15 SKU 3_B SKU 4_ B SKU 5_ B SKU 6_ B SKU 7_ B 
wholesale 14,827*** -2.192 0.650 0.821 13.05*** 16.71* 
 (4,338) (4.074) (3.331) (2.830) (4.766) (9.519) 
lagged_inv -0.412*** -0.61*** -0.869*** -1.186*** -0.766*** -0.684*** 
 (0.0783) (0.206) (0.163) (0.211) (0.139) (0.112) 
linear_trend 198.2 0.594 1.588* 2.329* 5.402*** 8.243*** 
 (352.5) (0.981) (0.795) (1.238) (1.426) (1.628) 
Constant 68,584*** 240.2*** 306.3*** 459.9*** 274.0*** 625.2*** 
 (13,055) (60.27) (39.98) (57.51) (39.08) (79.45) 
Observations 54 36 36 36 54 54 
















Table 2.4 Continued 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 






SKU 16 SKU 17 
wholesale 0.930 41.05 1.088 -10.68** 39.00** 262.7** 
 (2.506) (31.08) (21.79) (4.216) (18.37) (122.8) 
lagged_inv -0.338*** -0.783*** -0.289** -0.106 -0.452*** -0.425** 
 (0.0784) (0.260) (0.140) (0.0912) (0.151) (0.176) 
linear_trend 1.214** 14.27* 25.97** 2.486 3.201 26.41 
 (0.516) (8.143) (10.45) (2.914) (3.836) (20.00) 
Constant 79.26*** 2,927*** 104.3 82.12** 1,093*** 5,382*** 
 (11.73) (502.3) (91.74) (32.14) (164.9) (975.2) 
Observations 54 54 54 30 54 54 
R-squared 0.227 0.349 0.098 0.083 0.242 0.232 
 
 (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
 SKU 18 SKU 19 SKU 3_C SKU 4_ 
C 
SKU 5_ C SKU 6_ 
C 
wholesale 67.28** 2,880*** -1.061** -2.435 1.149 2.477 
 (31.00) (944.3) (0.414) (1.844) (2.294) (1.653) 
lagged_inv -0.390** -0.603*** -0.419*** -0.139* -0.495*** -0.160* 
 (0.160) (0.173) (0.102) (0.0703) (0.116) (0.0805) 
linear_trend 26.04** 363.5** -0.0633 -0.286 -4.711*** 0.0493 
 (12.54) (147.2) (0.137) (0.659) (1.206) (0.367) 
Constant 1,511*** 43,128*** 19.66*** 72.41** 259.3*** 39.49*** 
 (254.6) (6,797) (4.085) (26.56) (49.73) (14.17) 
Observations 54 54 36 36 36 54 





















Table 2.4 Continued 
 (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
 SKU 7_ C SKU 8_ 
C 





wholesale 1.731 -0.0191 0.211 -1.096 -1.370 11.55 
 (1.763) (0.277) (4.072) (1.452) (2.606) (7.138) 
lagged_inv -0.620*** -0.49*** -0.368*** -0.217* -0.437* -0.146** 
 (0.104) (0.121) (0.106) (0.114) (0.223) (0.0575) 
linear_trend -0.948*** -0.138* -2.662** 0.140 -0.318 -3.148* 
 (0.329) (0.0774) (1.012) (0.248) (0.711) (1.732) 
Constant 147.8*** 18.12*** 349.4*** 35.75*** 43.66 545.0*** 
 (19.19) (3.986) (58.84) (7.908) (26.07) (70.55) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 30 54 
R-squared 0.318 0.220 0.243 0.070 0.171 0.252 
 
 (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
 SKU 21 SKU 22 SKU 23 SKU 3_D SKU 4_ 
D 
SKU 5_ D 
wholesale 43.72 8.494 277.8 -0.616 -0.982 2.717 
 (68.06) (22.39) (665.7) (12.66) (3.139) (10.11) 
lagged_inv 0.0694* -0.130* -0.0472 -0.322*** -0.355** -0.265*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0763) (0.0879) (0.111) (0.150) (0.0810) 
linear_trend -42.9*** -5.462 -168.3 -5.086 -1.222 -4.813** 
 (9.732) (3.756) (162.2) (3.026) (0.776) (2.070) 
Constant 2,924*** 953.1*** 23,761*** 458.9*** 135.4*** 355.7*** 
 (450.0) (165.3) (3,065) (118.5) (37.08) (69.62) 
Observations 54 54 54 36 36 36 




















Table 2.4 Continued 
 (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) 








wholesale -2.793 4.380 0.121 6.364 1.813 13.53 
 (3.784) (5.418) (1.538) (30.42) (4.835) (11.15) 
lagged_inv -0.261** -0.205** -0.435*** -0.440*** -0.153 -0.118* 
 (0.112) (0.0956) (0.100) (0.114) (0.104) (0.0644) 
linear_trend 4.118** -0.952 1.684*** -28.19*** -0.320 -3.064 
 (1.647) (0.985) (0.476) (9.429) (0.964) (3.355) 
Constant 130.3*** 234.9*** 60.89*** 2,431*** 213.2*** 107.3 
 (30.44) (47.46) (11.64) (525.8) (45.39) (85.65) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 30 
R-squared 0.152 0.085 0.243 0.197 0.034 0.100 
 
 (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) 
 SKU 24 SKU 25 SKU 26 SKU 3_E SKU 4_ E SKU 5_ 
E 
wholesale 289.1** 57.13*** 1,303** -3.003 0.373 -0.116 
 (122.1) (18.46) (605.9) (2.125) (0.599) (2.092) 
lagged_inv -0.250*** -0.396*** -0.296*** -0.975*** -0.629*** -0.397 
 (0.0611) (0.0591) (0.0925) (0.197) (0.149) (0.243) 
linear_trend -13.07 1.652 -59.54 -0.256 0.0558 -3.859** 
 (10.20) (2.836) (80.54) (0.538) (0.135) (1.756) 
Constant 2,417*** 559.2*** 17,880*** 123.4*** 23.71*** 107.6** 
 (518.1) (108.0) (3,517) (24.02) (5.045) (48.39) 
Observations 54 54 54 36 36 36 





















Table 2.4 Continued 
 (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) 
 SKU 6_ E SKU 7_ E SKU 8_ E SKU 9_ E SKU 10_ E 
wholesale 0.568 2.158 0.526 2.152 0.442 
 (0.766) (2.148) (0.411) (6.051) (0.826) 
lagged_inv -0.615*** -0.785*** -0.752*** -0.793*** -0.625*** 
 (0.182) (0.143) (0.107) (0.193) (0.219) 
linear_trend 0.931*** -0.0855 -0.355*** -3.086*** 0.160** 
 (0.291) (0.347) (0.0683) (1.076) (0.0748) 
Constant -3.510 86.58*** 28.43*** 403.1*** 13.01*** 
 (2.920) (14.15) (3.828) (69.48) (3.635) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.314 0.369 0.436 0.287 0.174 
 
 (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) 
 SKU 27 SKU 28 SKU 3_F SKU 4_ 
F 
SKU 5_ F SKU 6_ 
F 
wholesale 50.98 260.0 -7.145** 0.533 -2.375 30.84* 
 (37.68) (208.0) (3.016) (5.518) (13.19) (15.56) 
lagged_inv -0.79*** -0.850*** -0.225** -0.284** -0.290*** -0.0622 
 (0.231) (0.158) (0.0876) (0.113) (0.0655) (0.173) 
linear_trend 8.067 -2.974 -3.336* -3.654 -3.224 1.192 
 (6.796) (34.90) (1.795) (2.308) (4.639) (3.081) 
Constant 1,527*** 11,992*** 255.7*** 209.5*** 498.5*** 246.1** 
 (298.2) (2,167) (55.60) (72.99) (83.14) (98.67) 
Observations 54 54 36 36 36 54 






















Table 2.4 Continued 
 (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) 







wholesale 8.264 -7.315 182.5** -0.687 -8.115 39.14 
 (13.64) (7.998) (74.55) (7.233) (7.078) (62.03) 
lagged_inv -0.339** -0.177** -0.288* -0.0391 -0.578*** -0.731*** 
 (0.140) (0.0876) (0.163) (0.137) (0.145) (0.186) 
linear_trend -1.739 5.366* -31.1*** 2.059 6.857*** 16.89*** 
 (1.771) (3.148) (9.571) (3.308) (2.382) (4.947) 
Constant 459.5*** 26.56 3,183*** 171.1*** 95.90*** 1,257*** 
 (86.20) (32.50) (614.0) (53.03) (28.02) (214.9) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 30 54 
R-squared 0.180 0.101 0.287 0.017 0.469 0.280 
 
 (72) (73) 
 SKU 30 SKU 31 
wholesale 8.920 367.4 
 (15.92) (309.1) 
lagged_inv -0.884*** -0.805*** 
 (0.251) (0.137) 
linear_trend 7.982* 195.4*** 
 (4.455) (52.32) 
Constant 549.8*** 9,347*** 
 (126.3) (1,166) 
Observations 36 54 

















Table 2.5:  Estimates of Model III 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SKU1 SKU1 SKU1 
wholesale_a -82.51*** -83.40*** -83.40*** 
 (0.277) (0.0849) (0.0849) 
wholesale_b 14.02*** -5.780*** -5.780*** 
 (0.596) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
wholesale_c -6.844*** -5.054*** -6.831*** 
 (0.379) (0.324) (0.391) 
wholesale_d -5.984*** -1.788*** -5.971*** 
 (0.379) (0.324) (0.391) 
wholesale_e -3.955*** -6.055*** -3.949*** 
 (0.173) (0.256) (0.179) 
wholesale_f 7.079*** -0.860*** 7.083*** 
 (0.118) (0.0837) (0.122) 
discount_a -11.98*   
 (5.169)   
discount_b 75.01***   
 (4.075)   
discount_c -11.08*  -10.89 
 (5.357)  (5.536) 
discount_d -13.45*  -13.26* 
 (5.357)  (5.536) 
discount_e 11.77***  11.86*** 
 (2.629)  (2.717) 
discount_f 82.95***  83.03*** 
 (2.335)  (2.413) 
linear_trend 0.171 0.284 0.348 
 (5.213) (5.385) (5.387) 
QuarterEnd_a -153.3*** -109.0*** -109.1*** 
 (18.43) (4.924) (4.926) 
QuarterEnd_b 842.1*** 714.7*** 714.8*** 
 (9.782) (6.657) (6.660) 
QuarterEnd_c 65.06*** 52.04*** 64.66*** 
 (11.66) (6.609) (12.04) 
QuarterEnd_d 374.6*** 347.7*** 374.2*** 
 (11.66) (6.609) (12.04) 
QuarterEnd_e 51.17*** 53.28*** 50.90*** 
 (8.014) (7.808) (8.281) 
QuarterEnd_f 382.4*** 483.6*** 382.0*** 
 (11.46) (8.374) (11.84) 
discount_lag_a  66.04*** 66.07*** 
  (2.968) (2.970) 
discount_lag_b  89.06*** 89.08*** 





Table 2.5 Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SKU1 SKU1 SKU1 
discount_lag_c  -8.439**  
  (2.484)  
discount_lag_d  -29.76***  
  (2.484)  
discount_lag_e  8.904***  
  (1.634)  
discount_lag_f  -32.87***  
  (0.383)  
Constant 2,241*** 2,239*** 2,228*** 
 (143.1) (147.4) (147.7) 
Observations 324 324 324 
R-squared 0.234 0.246 0.257 
Number of distributor 6 6 6 
Distributor FE Yes Yes Yes 
                          Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 (4) (5) (6) 
 SKU2 SKU2 SKU2 
wholesale_a -605.6*** -619.1*** -619.1*** 
 (2.112) (0.636) (0.637) 
wholesale_b 195.8*** 125.3*** 125.3*** 
 (4.545) (0.152) (0.152) 
wholesale_c -74.45*** -54.55*** -74.31*** 
 (2.887) (2.431) (2.936) 
wholesale_d -64.73*** -51.43*** -64.58*** 
 (2.887) (2.431) (2.936) 
wholesale_e -26.90*** -30.25*** -26.84*** 
 (1.320) (1.921) (1.343) 
wholesale_f 175.3*** 115.3*** 175.4*** 
 (0.902) (0.627) (0.917) 
discount_a -275.8***   
 (39.41)   
discount_b 183.7***   
 (31.06)   
discount_c -95.84*  -93.77* 







Table 2.5 Continued 
 (4) (5) (6) 
 SKU2 SKU2 SKU2 
discount_d -76.23  -74.15 
 (40.84)  (41.53) 
discount_e 12.60  13.61 
 (20.04)  (20.38) 
discount_f 498.2***  499.1*** 
 (17.80)  (18.10) 
linear_trend -54.05 -52.30 -52.03 
 (39.75) (40.34) (40.41) 
QuarterEnd_a -686.2*** -868.2*** -868.4*** 
 (140.5) (36.89) (36.95) 
QuarterEnd_b 5,318*** 4,836*** 4,836*** 
 (74.58) (49.88) (49.96) 
QuarterEnd_c 432.9*** 294.6*** 428.3*** 
 (88.86) (49.52) (90.35) 
QuarterEnd_d 2,504*** 2,407*** 2,499*** 
 (88.86) (49.52) (90.35) 
QuarterEnd_e 178.2** 179.3** 175.1** 
 (61.09) (58.50) (62.12) 
QuarterEnd_f 2,236*** 2,586*** 2,232*** 
 (87.34) (62.74) (88.81) 
discount_lag_a  371.8*** 371.9*** 
  (22.24) (22.28) 
discount_lag_b  377.5*** 377.6*** 
  (11.73) (11.75) 
discount_lag_c  -115.7***  
  (18.61)  
discount_lag_d  -67.61**  
  (18.61)  
discount_lag_e  18.86  
  (12.24)  
discount_lag_f  -482.6***  
  (2.869)  
Constant 16,708*** 16,669*** 16,563*** 
 (1,091) (1,105) (1,108) 
Observations 324 324 324 
R-squared 0.272 0.282 0.282 
Number of distributor 6 6 6 








Table 2.6:  Estimates of Model IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SKU 3_A SKU 4_ A SKU 5_ A SKU 6_ A SKU 7_ A SKU 8_ A 
wholesale -1.127 -1.109 -1.351 1.941 -1.786 1.516*** 
 (1.783) (0.704) (5.856) (1.371) (2.799) (0.428) 
QuarterEnd  -8.617 5.854 -37.09 7.438 -41.31** -8.598** 
 (6.420) (9.250) (35.54) (9.692) (16.57) (3.718) 
linear_trend -0.527* -1.661*** 1.097 0.0449 0.158 -0.285** 
 (0.286) (0.350) (1.533) (0.363) (0.555) (0.114) 
Constant 129.7*** 169.1*** 311.5*** 129.2*** 384.0*** 66.94*** 
 (7.437) (8.828) (37.06) (11.36) (19.34) (4.679) 
Observations 36 36 36 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.116 0.356 0.047 0.038 0.097 0.241 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 






SKU 12 SKU 13 SKU 14 SKU 15 
wholesale -3.377 -6.338 -25.26 -10.39 -95.7*** -42.65** -1,064** 
 (12.43) (4.077) (24.58) (6.209) (33.04) (19.67) (454.9) 
QuarterEnd  -100.7** -23.62 72.19 101.6* 227.5 164.4 5,303* 
 (48.46) (25.56) (136.2) (51.50) (213.0) (101.6) (2,875) 
linear_trend -2.146 4.92*** -11.48 -1.737 0.823 -6.07*** 1.447 
 (1.552) (1.052) (8.218) (1.179) (5.374) (1.563) (49.47) 
Constant 1542*** 194*** 303.1 1039*** 6804*** 2186*** 69645*** 
 (53.47) (35.10) (184.0) (43.24) (206.8) (63.43) (1931) 
Observations 54 54 30 54 54 54 54 
















Table 2.6 Continued 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
 SKU 3_B SKU 4_ B SKU 5_ B SKU 6_ B SKU 7_ B SKU 8_ B 
wholesale 0.465 0.207 2.772** -0.976 4.612* -0.214 
 (1.731) (0.760) (1.072) (1.925) (2.433) (0.636) 
QuarterEnd  42.71*** 37.45*** 47.47*** 25.96* 81.98*** 23.22*** 
 (11.25) (9.277) (10.14) (12.98) (18.39) (6.545) 
linear_trend -0.0515 -0.566* -1.473*** -1.356*** -1.305** -0.333** 
 (0.519) (0.295) (0.369) (0.433) (0.584) (0.135) 
Constant 106.7*** 94.46*** 149.6*** 222.6*** 406.1*** 68.77*** 
 (10.85) (6.037) (8.313) (15.20) (16.48) (4.855) 
Observations 36 36 36 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.345 0.466 0.563 0.255 0.342 0.346 
 
 (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 






SKU 16 SKU 17 SKU 18 SKU 19 
wholesale 0.775 0.860 0.497 2.251 11.72 3.805 72.17 
 (4.893) (4.823) (1.153) (2.826) (10.52) (4.741) (68.79) 
QuarterEnd  340*** 80.35* -1.244 162*** 864*** 216*** 6,614*** 
 (52.39) (41.57) (5.399) (27.13) (130.7) (26.56) (888.3) 
linear_trend -9.2*** 5.4*** 1.55*** -3.36*** -9.137** -6.5*** -81.50*** 
 (1.590) (1.172) (0.334) (0.757) (4.481) (1.047) (30.00) 
Constant 1,747*** 102.6** 12.63* 740.1*** 3,980*** 1,085*** 32,211*** 
 (52.72) (40.36) (6.511) (21.86) (132.9) (35.40) (995.1) 
Observations 54 54 30 54 54 54 54 


















Table 2.6 Continued 
 (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
 SKU 3_C SKU 4_ C SKU 5_ C SKU 6_ C SKU 7_ C SKU 8_ C 
wholesale -0.257 -0.494 -0.437 1.819 0.845 -0.0237 
 (0.282) (0.355) (1.318) (1.217) (0.936) (0.137) 
QuarterEnd  -1.616 10.23*** 3.299 4.888 5.954 -0.458 
 (2.043) (3.046) (8.163) (6.114) (5.122) (1.151) 
linear_trend 0.0192 -0.427*** -1.570*** -0.100 0.0228 -0.0101 
 (0.0620) (0.132) (0.388) (0.185) (0.104) (0.0346) 
Constant 7.984*** 34.69*** 113.2*** 28.50*** 51.32*** 5.965*** 
 (1.417) (1.925) (10.17) (6.868) (3.573) (1.404) 
Observations 36 36 36 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.064 0.433 0.310 0.095 0.068 0.005 
 
 (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 






SKU 20 SKU 21 SKU 22 SKU 23 
wholesale 2.480 -1.2*** -2.051 -0.267 14.84 15.12 648.7** 
 (2.218) (0.412) (1.796) (3.079) (38.39) (10.03) (270.4) 
QuarterEnd  45.24*** -0.0422 11.47 -9.961 31.73 13.29 -574.0 
 (15.12) (4.177) (10.54) (14.11) (181.0) (55.33) (1,447) 
linear_trend -1.91*** 0.009 -0.507 -2.14*** -4.539 -4.09*** -58.95 
 (0.358) (0.099) (0.557) (0.434) (5.433) (1.215) (57.92) 
Constant 186.3*** 21.79*** 15.61 399.9*** 2,410*** 690.7*** 18,063*** 
 (12.56) (3.290) (11.46) (16.33) (225.7) (53.03) (2,250) 
Observations 54 54 30 54 54 54 54 




















Table 2.6 Continued 
 (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) 
 SKU 3_D SKU 4_ D SKU 5_ D SKU 6_ D SKU 7_ D SKU 8_ D 
wholesale -0.155 -1.302* -1.832 -3.263*** 1.012 -0.461 
 (2.565) (0.768) (1.218) (1.179) (2.277) (0.330) 
QuarterEnd  48.98* 5.835 31.98*** 39.92*** 22.64* 4.090 
 (24.72) (4.533) (9.410) (13.86) (13.23) (3.423) 
linear_trend -1.147 -0.143 -1.148*** 2.375*** -0.0806 0.154 
 (0.924) (0.210) (0.363) (0.350) (0.381) (0.0969) 
Constant 196.1*** 52.44*** 160.8*** 30.14*** 132.3*** 20.89*** 
 (19.01) (4.494) (7.947) (10.98) (11.13) (3.215) 
Observations 36 36 36 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.200 0.117 0.430 0.577 0.093 0.091 
 
 (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) 
 SKU 9_ D SKU 10_ D SKU 11_ D SKU 24 SKU 25 SKU 26 
wholesale -1.033 -0.737 -4.602 -7.366 -0.727 -85.55** 
 (5.296) (2.620) (6.568) (7.487) (2.560) (34.80) 
QuarterEnd  187.7*** 37.79** 21.48 265.4*** 78.33*** 2,700*** 
 (40.46) (17.03) (34.96) (63.57) (21.15) (257.5) 
linear_trend -2.756** 0.291 -4.253* 0.366 -0.810* 28.58*** 
 (1.174) (0.591) (2.404) (2.209) (0.428) (9.008) 
Constant 837.1*** 136.8*** 99.30* 1,630*** 413.6*** 11,831*** 
 (32.28) (17.16) (57.55) (65.42) (15.55) (272.1) 
Observations 54 54 30 54 54 54 























Table 2.6 Continued 
 (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) 
 SKU 3_E SKU 4_ E SKU 5_ E SKU 6_ E SKU 7_ E SKU 8_ E 
wholesale -0.413 -0.510*** -0.777 0.0827 -0.328 0.432 
 (0.536) (0.165) (0.872) (0.311) (0.444) (0.288) 
QuarterEnd  5.100 -1.426 -1.781 -2.484 -5.698* -1.585 
 (5.672) (2.109) (4.916) (1.993) (3.262) (1.430) 
linear_trend 0.324 0.0526 -1.860*** 0.304*** -0.150 -0.135*** 
 (0.241) (0.0727) (0.204) (0.0705) (0.1000) (0.0433) 
Constant 29.17*** 11.62*** 56.00*** 1.144 44.35*** 10.81*** 
 (5.614) (1.621) (5.962) (1.524) (3.266) (1.864) 
Observations 36 36 36 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.085 0.115 0.678 0.355 0.099 0.189 
 
 (58) (59) (60) (61) 
 SKU 9_ E SKU 10_ E SKU 27 SKU 28 
wholesale -1.183 -0.0697 17.07*** 102.3*** 
 (1.226) (0.194) (5.786) (22.61) 
QuarterEnd  -8.336 0.756 49.70 280.6 
 (9.263) (1.543) (35.65) (231.4) 
linear_trend -0.766*** 0.0721* -1.740 -9.062 
 (0.200) (0.0368) (1.449) (6.918) 
Constant 180.9*** 6.196*** 784.1*** 4,413*** 
 (7.420) (1.243) (48.42) (212.0) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 






















Table 2.6 Continued 
 (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) 
 SKU 3_F SKU 4_ F SKU 5_ F SKU 6_ F SKU 7_ F SKU 8_ F 
wholesale 2.223 2.395 13.94* 14.62 4.450 5.616 
 (2.692) (2.331) (7.498) (13.59) (7.590) (7.750) 
QuarterEnd  -9.789 4.638 61.50 22.94 46.93 16.53 
 (12.35) (18.01) (44.94) (57.49) (42.27) (29.33) 
linear_trend -0.130 -3.764** -10.33*** 0.155 -2.767** 3.321*** 
 (0.801) (1.476) (1.827) (1.085) (1.119) (1.082) 
Constant 129.0*** 176.7*** 436.9*** 239.0*** 334.2*** 1.840 
 (19.61) (38.99) (52.91) (45.55) (33.36) (31.34) 
Observations 36 36 36 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.025 0.213 0.448 0.072 0.121 0.241 
 
 (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) 
 SKU 9_ F SKU 10_ F SKU 11_ F SKU 29 SKU 30 SKU 31 
wholesale 141.3** 5.594 -7.379** 14.66 5.668 118.2* 
 (61.40) (7.895) (3.585) (21.90) (5.540) (65.76) 
QuarterEnd  425.0 14.01 -19.70 187.1 -39.18 314.0 
 (368.9) (43.63) (27.68) (112.4) (32.04) (595.3) 
linear_trend -34.01*** 0.501 -1.791* 4.404** 1.751 45.24*** 
 (5.395) (0.975) (0.987) (1.778) (1.682) (13.73) 
Constant 2,450*** 155.7*** 85.78*** 808.1*** 280.3*** 6,681*** 
 (191.9) (32.67) (26.69) (72.29) (38.00) (336.0) 
Observations 54 54 30 54 36 54 




















Table 2.7:  Bullwhip Ratios 
Bullwhip Ratio Manufacturer A-F A B C D E F 
SKU 1 0.79 88.51 174.54 25.39 19.57 50.77 29.26 7.19 
SKU 2 0.19 80.18 216.67 18.42 4.73 34.46 43.54 6.16 
SKUs 1-2 0.17 85.13 216.97 19.23 5.33 36.12 41.75 6.22 
SKUs 3-31 0.14 75.79 94.15 24.80 3.85 58.49 51.14 6.78 
 
 
Table 2.8:  Correlation between Distributors’ Market Share and Trade Promotion 
   SKU 1 SKU 2 
Distributor A 0.15 0.13 
Distributor B 0.44** 0.43** 
Distributor C -0.18 -0.12 
Distributor D -0.0093 0.02 
Distributor E 0.14 0.09 
Distributor F 0.37** 0.33** 
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2.9:  Correlation between Distributors’ Market Share and Quarter Ends 
   SKU 1 SKU 2 
Distributor A -0.33** -0.27 
Distributor B 0.498** 0.43** 
Distributor C 0.15 0.09 
Distributor D 0.66** 0.75** 
Distributor E 0.15 0.04 
Distributor F 0.46** 0.40** 











Table 2.10:  Added Inventory Costs due to Promotions 
 Yearly Added Cost Percent of Sales 
Distributor A $346,176 1.16% 
Distributor B $205,580 1.20% 
Distributor C $26,914 0.82% 
Distributor D $55,081 0.82% 
Distributor E $19,749 0.97% 
Distributor F $21,288 0.30% 
Manufacturer $1,296,138 3.21% 







IN SEARCH OF INTRA-ECHELON BULLWHIPS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Supply chain managers and operations researchers alike have invested considerable 
effort over the past several decades to better understand the bullwhip effect and mitigate 
its negative consequences. The seminal paper of Lee et al. (1997a) defines the bullwhip 
effect as “the phenomenon where orders to the supplier tend to have larger variance than 
sales to the buyer (i.e., orders distortion), and the distortion propagates upstream in an 
amplified form (i.e., variance amplification)” (p. 546). Researchers have explored the cause 
of the bullwhip phenomenon and proposed a variety of remedies (e.g., Lee et al., 1997a; 
Chen et al., 2000; Chen & Lee, 2012). Other researchers have focused on empirically 
measuring the level of the bullwhip in practice and testing for possible drivers of its 
magnitude (e.g., Bray & Mendelson, 2012; Cachon et al., 2007; Dooley et al., 2010; Duan 
et al., 2015; Fransoo & Wouter, 2000; Lai, 2005; Jin et al., 2015; Mackelprang & Malhotra, 
2015; Shan et al., 2014; Zotteri, 2013). 
 The bullwhip definition noted above effectively looks across the firm, comparing 
the variability in the firm’s orders it places with its suppliers to the variability in the orders 
the firm receives from its customers. If the measure is greater than one then the bullwhip 





firm smooths rather than amplifies its order variability. This conventional bullwhip 
measure views the firm as one “entity” in the supply chain and constitutes an inter-firm 
bullwhip measure.  
 While the conventional bullwhip measure is informative and useful for determining 
what happens across a firm in the supply chain, numerous actions inside the firm contribute 
to its conventional bullwhip measure. By decomposing the firm’s conventional inter-firm 
bullwhip measure into three intra-firm (component) bullwhips, we offer the firm a simple 
and readily-implementable framework to employ “in search of” its internal bullwhip, and 
to track and reduce the variability in its product flow streams.      
The first bullwhip component in our framework is what we call the shipment 
bullwhip – it describes the variability in the firm’s shipment (i.e., sales) stream relative to 
the stream of demand (i.e., orders received). Moving upstream within the firm, the second 
component is referred to as the manufacturing bullwhip – it measures the variability in the 
firm’s manufacturing stream relative to its shipment stream. Next is the order bullwhip, 
defined as the variability in the stream of orders the firm places relative to the firm’s 
manufacturing stream. Mathematically, we show that multiplying these three intra-firm 
bullwhips results in the conventional inter-firm bullwhip measure. That is, the conventional 
bullwhip measure is the product of the firm’s shipment, manufacturing, and order 
bullwhips. 
In the remainder of this chapter, inter-firm bullwhip and intra-firm bullwhip are 
referred to as inter-echelon bullwhip and intra-echelon bullwhip, respectively, to account 
for the possibility that some entity other than a firm (e.g., a division within a firm, an 





 Using monthly, industry-level U.S. Census Bureau data, we proceed “in search of” 
the magnitude of each of intra-echelon bullwhips across industries, and we examine 
correlations between them. For example, we find that in some industries there is a very 
strong shipment antibullwhip (the shipment bullwhip measure is well below one, meaning 
shipments are much smoother than demands), while in other industries there is a significant 
shipment bullwhip (shipments are substantively more variable than demands). While our 
data are neither extensive nor informative enough to definitively assign cause and effect, 
we are able to make several observations regarding the differences in the industry 
characteristics. In general, we find that in industries where there is an antibullwhip in 
shipping, there is bullwhip created in manufacturing and/or ordering. However, industries 
that exhibit an antibullwhip in manufacturing also tend to order in a smoother stream than 
they manufacture (i.e., an antibullwhip in ordering). Our work therefore acts as a set of 
mini-case studies that can be used to motivate future research into what explains the 
observed disparity in intra-echelon bullwhips across industries. Although we report results 
based on industry-level data, the same analysis can also be performed at a less aggregate 
level (e.g., the divisional level, a product category level, and a product level). 
In addition to offering managers a framework for monitoring intra-echelon 
bullwhips, we provide insight into the impact of their decisions regarding the bullwhip 
measurement time interval. Our results are consistent with Chen and Lee (2012) who 
propose that time aggregation tends to dampen the bullwhip (i.e., when the bullwhip ratio 
is above one, time aggregation reduces it). Moreover, we find new empirical evidence that 
suggests time aggregate tends to amplify the bullwhip ratio when an antibullwhip exists; 





contribution of our work is to demonstrate the importance of properly setting the starting 
point for the time aggregation interval. For example, while many retailers use a February 
1 quarterly start date, we show that a start date of January 1 may be more appropriate for 
the purposes of bullwhip measurement.  
In sum, our empirical observations provide additional insight into the factors 
managers should take into account when determining their shipment schedules (which 
impact their shipment bullwhip), when setting their manufacturing plans (which impact 
their manufacturing bullwhip), and when establishing their order quantities (which impact 
their order bullwhip). While other researchers have studied some of the internal factors that 
might influence the overall bullwhip, such as inventory stocking levels (e.g., Svensson, 
2003) and manufacturing activities (e.g., Taylor, 1999), we contribute to this body of work 
by demonstrating how the intra-echelon bullwhips contribute to the overall inter-echelon 
bullwhip, both analytically and empirically.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 3.2 we explicitly lay out the bullwhip 
decomposition, showing how the shipment, manufacturing, and order bullwhips contribute 
to the overall (conventional) bullwhip measure. Next, in section 3.3 we develop hypotheses 
regarding whether we expect an intra-echelon bullwhip to be greater than or less than one 
(i.e., whether the bullwhip or antibullwhip predominates). We also hypothesize as to the 
effect of time aggregation and interval starting point.  We describe our dataset in section 







3.2 Bullwhip Decomposition 
 An ideal supply chain might be described as having a smooth flow of inventory 
throughout the chain.  Every echelon would 1) receive a perfectly smooth demand stream 
from its downstream customers; 2) fulfill this demand stream with a perfectly-matched 
shipment (i.e., sales) stream; 3) manufacture in a smooth just-in-time fashion, shipping 
immediately on completion with no need for any finished goods inventory; 4) order raw 
materials (RM) from upstream suppliers at a smooth rate that exactly matches the 
manufacturing flow stream; and 5) receive raw materials (i.e., fulfillment of orders) from 
its supplier in just-in-time fashion so as to avoid the need for raw materials inventory. This 
would result in no variance in any flow stream anywhere in the supply chain, that is, no 
bullwhip (or smoothing). Note that in this description the upstream progression could be 
executed via a pull system – downstream demand pulls shipments, shipments pull 
manufacturing, and manufacturing pulls orders as one moves upstream in the supply chain.  
Compared to this ideal, actual supply chains differ substantially, namely, there is 
virtually always some level of variability in each of the flow streams identified above. The 
framework we introduce in this chapter, as depicted in Figure 3.1, characterizes how the 
variability in each of these flow streams is either amplified or dampened when pulling the 
upstream flow. Note that our framework does not hinge on the use of a pull system. Instead, 
we use this terminology simply for convenience.  
Starting at the upper left of Figure 3.1, an echelon at any point in the supply chain 
(which we refer to as the focal echelon) receives a demand stream that has variance denoted 
by 𝑉𝐷
𝐹 (the superscript F refers to the focal echelon, while the subscript D denotes that this 





be able to) fulfill demands immediately, so its shipment stream may not exactly match its 
demand stream (by “demand stream” we mean the stream of orders received). For example, 
the economy may suddenly get stronger, creating a surge in demand that echelon F cannot 
immediately fill via manufacturing output and/or inventory. Thus, the variance in echelon 
F’s shipment stream, which we denote by 𝑉𝑆
𝐹 (the superscript again denoting echelon F 
and the subscript S referring to the shipment stream), may differ from the variance in its 
demand stream, 𝑉𝐷




𝐹 to be the echelon’s shipment bullwhip, 
and denote this bullwhip ratio by 𝐵𝑆
𝐹. Note that the shipment bullwhip might indicate an 





𝐹 > 1) or a smoothing (𝐵𝑆
𝐹 < 1). 
If echelon F holds finished goods (FG) inventory at any point in time, then its 
manufacturing output stream will not necessarily match its shipment stream. For example, 
demand may be seasonal, and even if demand is fully known in advance, echelon F may 
find it optimal to smooth its output (overproduce and build up finished goods inventory in 
periods of slack demand and under-produce and ship from inventory in periods of high 
demand). If demand is uncertain, this further complicates echelon F’s decision making with 
regard to the manufacturing stream. The manufacturing stream may become even further 
disconnected from the shipment stream due to factors such as the desirability of batch 
manufacturing. In other words, there may be what we denote as a manufacturing bullwhip 





𝐹 , where 𝑉𝑀
𝐹  denotes the variance in the 
manufacturing stream. The manufacturing bullwhip recognizes the fact that the 
manufacturing stream may differ from the shipment stream. Again, the manufacturing 
bullwhip may indicate an amplification (𝐵𝑀
𝐹 > 1) or smoothing (𝐵𝑀





Similarly, it may not be optimal for echelon F to order raw materials to exactly 
follow its manufacturing stream (i.e., for its order stream to follow its manufacturing 
stream). For example, an upstream echelon’s supply may be uncertain or it may offer end-
of-quarter discounts or have other promotions due to goods surpluses. Factors such as these 
may make it optimal for echelon F to alter its order stream as compared to the 
manufacturing stream (i.e., it may be optimal for an echelon to plan to hold raw materials 
inventory). We denote the variance in stream of orders that echelon F places by 𝑉𝑂
𝐹, and 






𝐹 denotes the variance in the order stream. 
Similar to the above discussion, the order bullwhip may indicate an amplification (𝐵𝑂
𝐹 > 1) 
or a smoothing (𝐵𝑂
𝐹 < 1). 
As previously noted, Lee et al. (1997a) effectively define the bullwhip as “order 
distortion.” Accordingly, echelon F’s overall, or “undecomposed,” bullwhip ratio (which 
we will denote by 𝐵𝐹 ) is defined to be the variance in the orders echelon F places with its 
suppliers (𝑉𝑂
𝐹 ) divided by the variance in the orders received by echelon F from its 
customers (𝑉𝐷





















Hereafter, when we use “bullwhip” as a stand-alone term, it will be used to mean 
the undecomposed bullwhip 𝐵𝐹 , or its surrogate (see discussion on a surrogate bullwhip 
measure below). Note that equation (3.1) decomposes echelon F’s inter-echelon bullwhip 
into three intra-echelon bullwhips. Starting from the downstream demand side of the 
echelon, the three intra-echelon bullwhips are the shipment bullwhip (variability in 





manufacturing flows as compared to shipments), and the order bullwhip (variability in the 
flow of orders placed as compared to manufacturing flows). The same setup applies for 
echelon F’s supplier, one level upstream in the supply chain. Using a superscript of U to 





















In some previous studies, surrogate measures have been used to estimate the 
bullwhip, 𝐵𝐹 . Since we also use these surrogate measures in a subset of our analysis, we 
describe these measures here. Specifically, because the dataset used by Cachon et al. (2007) 
does not include information for orders placed, they are unable to directly measure 𝑉𝑂
𝐹. 
Instead, Cachon et al. (2007) calculate what they call “production,” computed as the sales 
(i.e., shipments) plus the change in inventory. This production measure effectively 
represents the inflow of materials. We use the term “inflow” to reflect the quantity 
represented by shipments plus change in inventory, and denote the inflow variance by  𝑉𝐼
𝐹 





𝐹. Note that we have already effectively defined the 
inflow bullwhip (it is not yet another bullwhip) because the inflows to the focal echelon 
are effectively equal to the shipments of the upstream supply chain echelon. That is,  𝑉𝐼
𝐹 =
𝑉𝑆
𝑈, as shown in Figure 3.1. Also note from Figure 3.1 that orders placed by the focal 
echelon are effectively the demand (orders received) for the upstream echelon, so  𝑉𝑂
𝐹 =
𝑉𝐷








𝑈. For some supply chains the Cachon et al. (2007) dataset 
includes the orders received so the authors can directly calculate 𝑉𝐷
𝐹; in these cases, they 




















𝐹 =  𝐵𝐹 𝐵𝐼
𝐹 . That is, the bullwhip surrogate  𝐵∗
𝐹  is equal to the 
conventional bullwhip measure  𝐵𝐹  multiplied by the inflow bullwhip. For other supply 
chains their dataset also does not include data for orders received, so they use 𝑉𝑆
𝐹 as a 
surrogate measure for 𝑉𝐷









(the double asterisk is used to denote this particular surrogate bullwhip).  
The decomposition of the conventional inter-echelon bullwhip measure 𝐵𝐹  (or its 
surrogate) allows us to pinpoint where it is created within the echelon. Specifically, by 
looking at its three individual intra-echelon bullwhips, 𝐵𝑆
𝐹,  𝐵𝑀
𝐹 , and  𝐵𝑂
𝐹, we can identify 
whether the amplification (or smoothing) occurs in shipping, and/or manufacturing, and/or 
ordering. We next develop hypotheses regarding the direction and magnitude of these 
bullwhips and generate hypotheses regarding the time duration over which they should be 
measured and the duration starting point. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
We discuss factors plausibly associated with our measures of shipment, 
manufacturing, and order bullwhips. In addition to factors discussed below, which all 
assume echelon F is making decisions optimally (to maximize expected profit), there may 
be behavioral factors which lead to bullwhip amplification (or even possibly smoothing) 
(e.g., Bendoly et al., 2006; Croson & Donohue, 2006). 
Because of factors such as batch production, production smoothing, and order 





equal one (the variance in the stream of orders placed may not be equal to the variance in 
the stream of demands). That is, there are a host of factors that may induce echelon F, when 
operating optimally, to amplify or dampen a shipment bullwhip, a manufacturing bullwhip, 
or an order bullwhip. The decision making becomes even more complex in a multiechelon 
supply chain, where one echelon’s decisions impact both the upstream and downstream 
echelons. Most likely, identifying the optimal set of decisions given this complexity is not 
a tractable problem – and even if the optimal decisions could be identified so as to reduce 
costs (or increase revenues) within the supply chain, it will be problematic to determine 
how to share the benefit among the various echelons within the chain. However, the 
framework discussed herein is intended to help move echelon F one step closer to this 
ultimate objective by identifying the importance of tracking intra-echelon bullwhip effects 
and adjusting its supply chain based on these observed bullwhips. 
 
3.3.1 Shipment Bullwhip Magnitude 





𝐹 . There 
are several factors suggesting it may not be possible (or desirable) to always ship exactly 
per the demand stream. Some dynamics work in the direction of smoothing, and others 
work in the direction of variance amplification. 
One factor that may (under certain conditions) tend to smooth shipments relative to 
demand is an inventory constraint. If inventory holding costs are significant, then it may 
not be cost-effective to hold enough inventory to fill all the demand peaks. On the other 
hand, the inventory constraint may (under other circumstances) actually work to amplify 





pattern, while manufacturing produces in batches. In this case, if inventory is not sufficient 
to fill the demand, then shipments will have to wait until a batch of goods is manufactured, 
at which point the whole batch (or a significant fraction of it) will be shipped.  Thus, 
shipments will appear to be “clumpy” when compared to the smooth demand stream. 
Analytically, Chen and Lee (2012) show that, under their assumptions, the variance 
of sales (shipments, in our terminology) is less than that of demand. The intuition is that 
shipments (assumed to be equal to the minimum of demand and on-hand inventory) is a 
truncated variable, so inventory censoring makes shipments appear less variable. This 
result implies that the shipment bullwhip is less than one. Thus, we propose the following 
hypothesis which enables us to test which theory prevails: 
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1). The shipment bullwhip is less than one.  
 
3.3.2 Manufacturing Bullwhip Magnitude 
If there are significant fixed costs in manufacturing, or if it is expensive to change 
the rate of manufacturing output, then it may be desirable to produce at a constant, steady 
pace as compared to following the ups and downs of demand (or more specifically, the ups 
and downs of shipments) – the capacity requirement if manufacturing at a smooth output 
rate is equal to the average demand rate, while the capacity requirement if following the 
peaks and valleys of demand is the highest demand rate. This will tend to smooth 





𝐹 < 1. 
On the other hand, echelon F may tend to amplify manufacturing variability as 
compared to shipment variability if the firm produces periodically in large batches rather 





then ship from inventory, resulting in relatively more smooth shipments as compared to 
manufacturing. 
We hypothesize that the forces behind manufacturing smoothing predominate, 
given the extensive work in this area by economists (e.g., Fair, 1989; Blinder & Maccini, 
1991; Ramey & West, 1999) and the analytical and empirical work of operations 
management researchers (e.g., Klein, 1961; Cachon et al., 2007; Bray & Mendelson, 2015). 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2). The manufacturing bullwhip is less than one.  
 
3.3.3 Order Bullwhip Magnitude 
Echelon F may tend to smooth orders relative to manufacturing output in an attempt 
to smooth deliveries of raw materials (e.g., it may have docking or “port” capacity 
constraints).  In addition, it may face pressure from suppliers to buy in a steady stream, to 






𝐹 < 1.  
However, it is plausible that other factors may influence the variability of orders 
relative to that of manufacturing output. For example, the supplier may insist on a 
minimum order quantity which exceeds the quantity echelon F might otherwise purchase. 
Also, order batching can be a routine part of echelon F’s purchase decision process due to 
economies of scale in purchasing associated with factors such as volume discounts and 
transportation (e.g., truckload shipments). An upstream echelon may offer periodic or 
sporadic price promotions to increase sales volume (shipments) and liquidate excess 
inventory, which encourage bulk purchases. The previous literature has reported that 





inventory (e.g., Blattberg & Levin, 1987; Jin et al., 2015b). Given that both order batching 
and price promotions imply that the order stream is more volatile than the manufacturing 
stream, we offer the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3). The order bullwhip is greater than one.  
 
3.3.4 Impact of Duration of the Time Interval on the Bullwhip 
When empirically measuring the bullwhip effect, researchers need to determine an 
appropriate time interval (e.g., weekly, monthly, or quarterly) over which to aggregate the 
flow values which are then used in calculations of the variances of orders, shipments, and 
manufacturing output. Previous studies (e.g., Fransoo & Wouters, 2000; Cachon et al., 
2007; Chen & Lee, 2012) suggest that the proper aggregation across time should depend 
on the specific problem under investigation. Chen and Lee (2012) develop an analytical 
model to show that “aggregating data over relatively long time periods can mask the 
bullwhip effect” (p. 772). More specifically, they show that for a first-order autoregressive 
moving average (ARMA (1, 1)) demand process, the temporally aggregated bullwhip ratio 
will approach one in the limit as the aggregation period increases. Furthermore, they show 
that if the bullwhip ratio is greater than one, then the ratio will decrease monotonically to 
one as the aggregated time period increases. These results suggest that measuring the 
variance ratio over a longer time period tends to attenuate the bullwhip (or antibullwhip) 
effect, leading to the following hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 4 (H4). If the bullwhip ratio is greater than one then time 
aggregation decreases the ratio, while if it is less than one then time aggregation 





The smoothing that is hypothesized to occur with aggregation over longer time 
intervals may be related to seasonality in data series. To illustrate this possibility, consider 
the monthly sales data shown in Figure 3.2 – this plot is representative of sales data across 
45 Wal-Mart stores for the period February 2010 to October 2012 (Kaggle, 2015). Note the 
seasonality in the data; longer time aggregation intervals have the potential to combine a 
maximal demand with a lesser demand (or a minimal demand with a greater demand), 
thereby reducing the variance. Assuming the seasonality propagates upstream, the variance 
of the upstream flow stream is also diminished, so the impact of seasonality on the bullwhip 
will depend on which flow (upstream or downstream) exhibits the most seasonality.  
HYPOTHESIS 5 (H5). Seasonality will result in a higher (lower) aggregated 
bullwhip ratio when the upstream flow is less (more) seasonal than the downstream 
flow. 
 
3.3.5 Impact of the Starting Point of the Time Interval on the Bullwhip 
Managers must not only choose the duration of the time interval over which they 
measure their bullwhips, they must also set the starting point of that interval. Assume for 
the moment that echelon F decides it is most appropriate to use quarterly time durations to 
measure and track its bullwhip. Does it matter whether they start the quarter at January 1 
versus February 1 versus March 1? (These three start dates effectively cover all possibilities 
since we do not consider starting mid-month.) 
For all 45 Wal-Mart stores referenced in the Kaggle (2015) dataset, we find that the 
variance in the quarterly sales series when starting the quarter in February is less than that 





observation that December is the highest sales month, while January is the lowest sales 
month. Grouping the peak and valley into the same quarter partially balances the difference. 
Since the variance of sales is the denominator of the bullwhip ratio 𝐵∗∗
𝐹  , quarterly 
aggregation based on a start in February (Nov/Dec/Jan quarter) or March (Dec/Jan/Feb 
quarter) might be expected to result in a higher bullwhip ratio as compared to a start in 
January (Oct/Nov/Dec quarter).   
Furthermore, a review of quarterly reports from Wal-Mart, Costco, Target, and 
Kohl’s suggests that inflows (which in this case roughly equates to receipt of the goods to 
be sold) typically lead sales by one quarter – knowing that sales will peak in quarter four 
(knowing the seasonality pattern), these retailers prepare by over-producing (i.e., by 
increasing inflows) in the third quarter. Assuming inflows (or manufacturing, in the case 
of a manufacturer) leads sales (shipments) by one month, the inflow peak occurs in 
November and the trough occurs in December, suggesting that inflows would be smoothest 
(have the least variance) with the Nov/Dec/Jan (Feb start) and Oct/Nov/Dec (Jan start) 
quarters as compared to the Dec/Jan/Feb (March start) quarters. Since the variance of 
inflows is the numerator of the bullwhip ratio 𝐵∗∗
𝐹 , quarterly aggregation based on a start in 
March (Dec/Jan/Feb quarter) might be expected to result in a higher bullwhip ratio as 
compared to a start in January (Oct/Nov/Dec quarter) or February (Nov/Dec/Jan quarter). 
Regarding previous empirical analysis in this regard, Bray and Mendelson (2012) 
argue that different time aggregation schemes will yield different results for any particular 
firm, but do not find a general effect. 
HYPOTHESIS 6 (H6). For quarterly data, a February or March starting month 






Our analysis uses the same monthly, industry-level U.S. Census Bureau data as used 
by Cachon et al. (2007). These data are from January 1992 to February 2006 and cover 8 
retail, 21 wholesale, and 86 manufacturing industries (we, as do Cachon et al., 2007, 
exclude some Census data to avoid possible duplication – some overlap occurs across the 
industries because some data within one industry code may be aggregated into another 
industry code). We do not incorporate post-2006 data in our analysis (our data range is 
from 1992 to 2006) since Dooley et al. (2010) find that firms responded differently to the 
economic recession of 2007-2009. Given that we use industry data, the superscript F will 
denote the focal industry. 
The Census reports monthly sales (i.e., shipments, in the terminology of this chapter) 
and inventories for each industry. The industry’s inflow number in a given month t is 
calculated as the shipments in that month plus the change in inventory (that month’s 
inventory minus last month’s inventory): 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑡−1 , 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑡 denotes the inventory in month 𝑡. This inflow number effectively represents 
incoming shipments received from the upstream suppliers, that is, it is the upstream 
shipment quantity. From these inflow numbers we calculate the inflow variance, 𝑉𝐼
𝐹.  
We divide manufacturing industries into three sets of data; A, B, and C (see Table 
3.1). The A dataset includes 52 industries (A1 through A52) for which data are available 




𝐹. The B dataset includes 23 industries (B1 through B23) for which there are 
shipment data but no demand data. The C dataset includes 11 durable goods manufacturing 





separate durable goods from other industries given that results may differ).  
The Census does not report orders placed for any industries. Since we have the 
demand (but not order placement) numbers for the A dataset, we calculate the surrogate 









𝐹. For the B and C datasets, since 






𝐹 =  𝐵𝑀
𝐹  𝐵𝑂
𝐹 𝐵𝐹
𝐼 .  
The U.S. Census reports materials-and-supplies inventory (we infer this to mean 
raw materials, RM), work-in-process inventory (WIP), and finished goods inventory (FG) 
for 24 manufacturing industries (10 in the A dataset, 11 in B, and 3 in C). In our tables, we 
identify these 24 industries by underscoring the letter-number identifier, for example, A6 
Computer and Electronic Products, B1 Apparel, and C11 Wood Products. For each of these 
24 industries we infer the manufacturing series from its shipments, WIP, and FG, by 
assuming the WIP consists of half-finished product: 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 = 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
(𝐹𝐺𝑡 − 𝐹𝐺𝑡−1) + 0.5(𝑊𝐼𝑃𝑡 − 𝑊𝐼𝑃𝑡−1).  Thus, for these 24 “underscored” industries, we 
can calculate 𝑉𝑀






For the 10 underscored industries included in the A data subset (A6, A16, A21, A22, 
A24, A29, A40, A44, A49, and A50), we use U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
Input-Output data to identify the source and magnitude of the materials consumed by each 
industry and then infer the orders. Thus, for these 10 industries, we have the full 
decomposition of the bullwhip, 𝐵𝑆
𝐹, 𝐵𝑀
𝐹 , and 𝐵𝑂
𝐹. While this is a relatively limited dataset, 






The demand and shipment series are margin-adjusted to convert into cost dollar 
units for inventory valuations. Demand, shipment, and inventory series are price-index-
adjusted so that changes over time are not influenced by inflation. The demand, shipment, 
manufacturing, and inflow series are logged and first-differenced to remove the time trend. 
(See Cachon et al. (2007) for details regarding, and the rationale behind, these adjustments 
to the data.) 
The inflow and demand series will probably exhibit some cyclical variation known 
as seasonality. We use the seasonality ratio developed by Cachon et al. (2007) to quantify 
the seasonality:  
 
𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑉[𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠] − 𝑉[𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠]
𝑉[𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠]
 (3.2) 
where the data series can be either the inflow series or the demand series. The 
deseasonalized data series is the residuals from regressing data series on 11 monthly 
dummy variables. The seasonality ratio represents the fraction of variance that can be 
explained by seasonality.  
 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
Hypotheses presented in section 3.3.1 through section 3.3.5 are tested in section 
3.5.1 through section 3.5.6. These results inform our quests “in search of” intra-echelon 
bullwhips. Results also suggest the need for managers to proceed “in search of” their own 






3.5.1 Shipment Bullwhip Magnitude 
Table 3.2 shows the shipment bullwhips for the A dataset: the 52 manufacturing 
industries for which both sales and demand data are available. The monthly results are 
evenly split in the sense that 26 bullwhip ratios are less than one and 26 are one or greater. 
However, a plot of the data in Figure 3.3 shows a cluster of industries (on the right) with 
very low shipment bullwhips (the y-value divided by the x-value); these industries smooth 
shipments relative to demand. The average ratio indicates smoothing and the t-test result is 
similarly consistent with H1. 
It is instructive to look more closely at characteristics of those industries with 
larger-than-average shipment bullwhip and antibullwhip outcomes. First, consider the 
antibullwhipping industries. As an example, we plot in Figure 3.4 the shipments versus 
demand for industry A47: Ships and Boats (total). Figure 3.4 shows it is not uncommon to 
get a spike in demand that is double the average. The other industries in Figure 3.3 that 
exhibit strong antibullwhip shipment ratios (with shipment bullwhip ratios < 0.5) are a 
couple of defense-related industries; A12: Defense Aircraft and Parts and A45: Search and 
Navigation Equipment Mfg Defense, along with A37: Nondefense Aircraft and Parts, and 
A46: Search and Navigation Equipment Mfg Nondefense. These industries appear likely 
to operate in make-to-order fashion, producing only after orders are confirmed. Given the 
fixed costs in these heavy-equipment industries, it would be cost prohibitive for the 
industry to build capacity equal to the abnormally-high peak demand, so customers who 
order during a demand spike will presumably have to wait for delivery (shipment) of their 
order. 





industry with a strong shipment bullwhip, A20: Electronic Computer Manufacturing. Note 
the spike in demand every third month, along with an even higher spike in shipments during 
that same month. The spikes occur in March, June, October, and December – that is, at 
what is (for the majority of firms) the end of the quarter. Thus, these results illustrate the 
hockey stick phenomenon, where sales spike in the last month of the quarter, presumably 
in an effort to meet quarterly financial expectations (Bradley & Arntzen, 1999; Singer et 
al., 2009). The high depreciation rates of computer equipment (something on the order of 
50% per year) result in an extremely high holding cost, so computer manufacturers are 
hesitant to overbuild when producing in make-to-stock fashion. Figure 3.5 suggests that at 
the end of the quarter, however, they rush to build so as not to lose any end-of-quarter sales 
opportunities. Interestingly, inventory numbers (not shown here) suggest they end the 
quarter with their lowest monthly inventory, so (as shown in Figure 3.5) in the next month 
(the first month of the quarter) they fall short on shipments as compared to demand. A 
further possible factor leading to the end-of-quarter rush is that customers may place 
regular unfirm orders in the earlier months of the quarter but not make actual purchases 
until receiving end-of-quarter discounts from their supplier. What makes these actions 
more tenable in A20 (Electronic Computer Manufacturing) as compared to A47 (Ships and 
Boats) is that the fixed costs of capacity, and other costs of quickly ramping manufacturing 
up and down, are presumably much lower in A20.  
These results suggest that it is too simplistic to suggest that firms should (or do) 
either amplify or smooth shipments relative to demand. Instead, there appear to be factors 






3.5.2 Manufacturing Bullwhip Magnitude 
For the 24 industries for which we can calculate the manufacturing bullwhip (based 
on monthly data), only five have 𝐵𝑀
𝐹 > 1 (see Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5). The manufacturing 
bullwhip ratio is statistically significantly less than one, suggesting that industries generally 
smooth manufacturing relative to shipments. This is consistent with the manufacturing 
smoothing hypothesis in the economics literature, as discussed in section 3.3. H2 is 
supported.  
While smoothing predominates in manufacturing, three of the 24 industries have 
manufacturing bullwhips greater than 1.05. These industries and their manufacturing 
bullwhip ratios are: B3: Beverage and Tobacco Products (1.19); A24: Furniture and Related 
Products (1.19), and B15: Petroleum and Coal Products (1.84). Characteristics of these 
industries are that they have highly cyclical demand (demand in peak months is roughly 
25% higher than in slack months), but even more cyclical manufacturing (manufacturing 
tracks demand relatively closely, but accentuates the peaks and valleys).  For example, in 
the B3 industry (Beverage and Tobacco) we find peak consumption occurs in the summer 
months, with a trough in January-February. In the A24 industry (Furniture) we find dips in 
July and December, and heavy demand during August through October and a lower peak 
in March. For the B15 industry (Petroleum and Coal) we find heavy consumption during 
the summer months of May through August and low demand in the winter months of 
December to March. In all three industries manufacturing output in the peak month (lowest 
month) is about 3% higher (3% lower) than shipments, except for B3 where manufacturing 
is 12% lower in December.  





plant shutdowns during summer and extended holidays, along with weather conditions that 
facilitate higher summer output and/or lower winter output. Another factor may be lack of 
storage capacity – for example, coal can be expensive to store due to space requirements, 
so unexpected spikes in demand may need to be met with short-term bursts in output (e.g., 
Mining Congress Journal, 1922). This may be exacerbated by customers who rely on the 
spot market for purchasing coal rather than entering into longer-term contracts (Murray, 
1982). 
 
3.5.3 Order Bullwhip Magnitude 
The Census does not report the orders placed by an industry to its supplier, so we 
are not able to directly calculate the order bullwhip. But we use BEA Input-Output data to 
infer the orders placed and then calculate the order bullwhips for the ten A industries, as 
shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.6. We find that the order bullwhip ratio is less than one 
for six out of the ten industries; H3 is not supported. Industries with the highest order 
bullwhips were (order bullwhip numbers are given in parentheses) A44: Primary Metals 
(1.16) and A40: Nondurable Goods Total (1.12). 
Figure 3.6 consolidates the decomposition results for the ten A industries. Not 
surprisingly, given the above discussions, the greatest tendency for smoothing occurs in 
manufacturing (rather than shipping or ordering). Somewhat surprisingly, ordering tends 
to also result in an antibullwhip. Shipments can exhibit extreme smoothing, although some 







3.5.4 Correlation between the Intra-Echelon Bullwhips 
Using a system dynamics simulation model, and calibrating the model with data 
from an auto assembly plant, Klug (2013) finds that the bullwhip ratio at one echelon within 
a firm is negatively correlated with the one at the next echelon. On the other hand, there 
are scenarios where bullwhip ratios at consecutive echelons are positively correlated. For 
example, the more a firm smooths its manufacturing relative to shipments, the more it may 
be able to operate in just-in-time fashion, ordering raw materials directly as it uses them, 
indicating that the manufacturing bullwhip is positively correlated with the order bullwhip. 
How intra-echelon bullwhips are correlated may be resolved empirically.  
The intra-echelon bullwhips are plotted against each other in Figure 3.7; see Table 
3.3 for details and statistical results for the 10-industry study of the A industries. Again 
using the convention of starting downstream and moving upstream in the supply chain, in 
all cases, we plot the downstream bullwhip as the “independent variable” on the x-axis and 
the upstream bullwhip as the “dependent variable” on the y-axis. There is a negative but 
not significant association between the manufacturing and shipment bullwhips. In the 




on the y-axis, that is, the product of the manufacturing, order, and inflow bullwhips. This 
plot shows a negative relationship; if smoothing is induced in shipping, then amplification 
tends to occur upstream, and vice versa.  
This suggests that when firms smooth the shipments, they tend to create a bullwhip 
in manufacturing and/or ordering. Possibly, the shipment is less volatile than demand due 
to a lack of finished goods inventory that would be needed to immediately fill demand. 





which in turn induces the firm to place large orders of raw materials and therefore creates 
a bullwhip in ordering. In short, when the firm chooses not to ship in a stream duplicating 
the demand stream, the firm is more likely to manufacture and/or order raw materials in a 
more variable fashion as compared to the way it ships. It may be a conscious decision to 
smooth shipments relative to demand, or it may be a suboptimal outcome and one that 
antagonizes the customer. Similarly, we cannot say definitively that is a bad thing to 
amplify the manufacturing and order streams relative to the shipment stream. However, 
our results point to the need for firms to consciously analyze their shipment, manufacturing, 
and order streams and to make sure they communicate and coordinate their shipment, 
manufacturing, and ordering decisions with their customers and suppliers as appropriate.   
If smoothing (amplifying) happens in manufacturing, then the upstream bullwhip 
component (i.e., order bullwhip) tends to also smooth (amplify), as shown in the middle-
top frame of Figure 3.7. So the order bullwhip is positively associated with the 
manufacturing bullwhip. Further supporting evidence is shown in the lower-right frame of 
Figure 3.7; if smoothing (amplifying) occurs in manufacturing, then the upstream bullwhip 
𝐵𝑂
𝐹𝐵𝐼
𝐹 tends to also smooth (amplify). The rationale for this relationship needs further study. 
If a firm induces a bullwhip in its orders, resulting in high variability in demand for 
the upstream firm, this upstream firm may have a hard time following the peaks and valleys 
with its shipments (which become the inflow to the focal firm). This suggests that the 
inflow bullwhip is negatively associated with the order bullwhip, as shown in the upper-






3.5.5 Impact of Duration of the Time Interval on the Bullwhip 
In order to explore the impact of time aggregation, we proceed by simply 
aggregating the monthly data for each industry into quarterly, semiannual, and yearly data. 
Bullwhip ratios calculated using monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and yearly data are called 
monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and yearly bullwhip ratios, respectively (quarterly, 
semiannual, and yearly results are calculated using January as the starting month). Tables 
3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 report the bullwhip ratios based on different time aggregation schemes for 
A, B, and C datasets, respectively. Figure 3.8 plots the bullwhip ratios for the A, B, and C 
data series (excluding one outlier data point). We notice that, for bullwhippers, aggregation 
tends to dampen the bullwhip – observe that for a bullwhip ratio greater than one the 
trendline falls below the 1:1 diagonal (the aggregated quarterly bullwhip is less than the 
monthly bullwhip for 19 out of 28 of the industries that have a monthly bullwhip greater 
than one). On the other hand, if the industry was an antibullwhipper (i.e., it was a 
“smoother”) on a monthly basis (that is, if the bullwhip ratio is less than one on a monthly 
basis) then aggregation to a quarterly level tends to amplify the bullwhip (in this case, the 
trendline falls above the 1:1 diagonal and the aggregated quarterly bullwhip is greater than 
the monthly bullwhip for 39 out of 58 of the industries that have a monthly bullwhip less 
than one). In other words, in both situations aggregations tend to push the bullwhip closer 
to a “neutral” value of one. While previous research has similarly shown the dampening 
effect on the bullwhip, an added contribution of our work is to show the converse 
“dampening” effect on the antibullwhip.   
Retailer and wholesaler results are given in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively. 





bullwhip ratio is generally dampened when using quarterly and yearly data. Retailers are 
generally smoothers using monthly data, but we find that six out of nine become slight 
bullwhippers on a yearly base. Table 3.8 summarizes the results across all industries. All 
of the statistically significant results point to time aggregation decreasing the bullwhip ratio 
if the bullwhip ratio is greater than one before aggregation, or point to time aggregation 
increasing the bullwhip ratio if the bullwhip ratio is less than one before aggregation. H4 
is supported. 
Seasonality, to a large extent, may cause the differences between the monthly and 
quarterly (semiannual and yearly) bullwhip ratios. More specifically, it is differences in the 
way seasonality manifests itself in inflow of materials versus demand. Before delving into 
statistical findings regarding the seasonality measure, we use Figure 3.9 to motivate the 
intuition. First look at the upper-left frame of Figure 3.9. Industry A22: Fabricated Metal 
Products is neither a bullwhipper nor a smoother if one uses monthly data – it had a 
bullwhip ratio of 1.01. Each data point for “Inflow” indicates whether inflows in that month 
increase relative to inflows in the previous month (technically, each data point is the 
average monthly first difference between the log of inflows in that month versus the 
previous month – this technique follows Cachon et al. (2007)). It is similar for demand. 
For this industry the inflow and demand graphs track nearly one-to-one. The inflow and 
demand series exhibit a similar degree of seasonality; the seasonality ratios are 0.69 and 
0.65, respectively. The monthly data are aggregated into quarterly data in the upper-right 
frame in Figure 3.9. The resulting bullwhip ratio is 1.06, and the graphs of inflow and 
demand again track nearly one-to-one.  





Drugs and Druggists’ Sundries. First, note that the monthly bullwhip ratio is 4.15, while 
quarterly ratio is 2.88. Next note a spike in inflow every third month, coinciding with the 
end of each quarter (assuming a January fiscal year start), along with a dip in every month 
prior (and generally following) the spike. There is also a demand spike in March and 
December, along with a dip before and after the spike. The seasonality ratios for the inflow 
and demand series are 0.67 and 0.46, respectively, so inflow exhibits a higher degree of 
seasonality than demand. When the monthly data are aggregated into quarterly data, each 
spike tends to be muted because it is aggregated with a dip. Since inflow is more seasonal 
than demand, the inflow series has more spikes to be muted, and thus, the reduction in 
variance due to aggregation is greater than for the demand series. The more dampened 
number is in the numerator of the bullwhip ratio, helping explain why the quarterly 
bullwhip ratio is lower.  
The reverse happens with the retail industry R5: Furniture, Home Furnishings, 
Electronics, and Appliance Stores as shown in the bottom frame of Figure 3.9. The monthly 
bullwhip ratio is 0.63, while quarterly ratio is 1.02. There is a big demand spike in 
December (and lesser spikes in March and August). The December spike is followed by a 
plummeting January demand. There are inflow spikes in March and October, along with 
dips before and after the spikes. Since demand shows a higher degree of seasonality than 
inflow (seasonality ratios are 0.97 and 0.71, respectively), the demand series tends to be 
more dampened under data aggregation than the inflow series. The more muted number is 
in the denominator of the bullwhip ratio, so it increases the bullwhip number.  
These three representative cases suggest that if seasonality of inflow is more (less) 





tends to be lower (higher). We test whether this result holds for other industries. As shown 
in Table 3.9, the majority of industries across manufacturing, retail, and wholesale sectors 
show a higher (lower) bullwhip ratio when inflow is less (more) seasonal than demand. For 
wholesalers we find that the negative association between these two ratios is statistically 
significant, supporting H5. The associations for manufacturers and retailers likewise 
directionally support H5.  
 
3.5.6 Impact of the Starting Point of the Time Interval on the Bullwhip 
Roughly two-thirds of U.S. public traded firms start their fiscal year in January 
(Wikipedia, 2015), so this has been used as the baseline in calculating quarterly, semiannual, 
and yearly results. We repeat our analysis with a February or March start and obtain 
qualitatively similar results to those reported in sections 3.5.1-3.5.5. However, for many 
industries, a start of the fiscal year in February yields a quite dramatic increase in the 
bullwhip ratio as compared to starting in January (see Table 3.10, and Figure 3.10). Starts 
in either February or March yield statistically significant results for the A and C datasets of 
manufacturers (as compared to a January start), offering support for H6. As discussed in 
section 3.3.5, it appears this can be caused by “artificial” smoothing of the demand peaks 
and valleys of the Christmas and postholiday season under the February and March 
quarterly starts. As shown in Table 3.10, H6 is generally supported across all datasets 









We develop a framework to decompose the inter-echelon bullwhip measure into 
three intra-echelon bullwhips which we denote as the shipment, manufacturing, and order 
bullwhips. While much of the empirical work to-date has focused on bullwhip phenomenon 
across the firm, our framework allows us to empirically measure the magnitudes of these 
three intra-echelon bullwhips. We conduct this empirical analysis using the Census data, 
which aggregates firms into industries – thus, the following observations describe general 
trends rather than firm-specific results.  
With regard to the three intra-echelon bullwhips, we find over 10% of the industries 
exhibit an extreme degree of smoothing in shipping (e.g., A47: Ships and Boats, with 
𝐵𝑆
𝐹 =0.08), while others (about one-half) exhibit amplification of shipments relative to 
demands. In manufacturing we primarily observe the presence of an antibullwhip 
(manufacturing tends to proceed in a smoother fashion than shipping), however exceptions 
exist. Ordering also tends to smooth, but the trend is not universal.  
Thus overall, we find smoothing predominates for all three intra-echelon bullwhips 
– shipment, manufacturing, and ordering. However, just as we find it instructive to look 
intra-firm instead of just across firms, we also find our work acts as a set of mini-case 
studies in that it identifies some characteristics of industries which exhibit behavior that 
diverges from the mean performance. For example, industries that exhibit a high shipment 
bullwhip seem to suffer from the hockey stick phenomenon – or is “suffer” the right word 
(possibly the behavior is optimal)? Conversely, industries that benefit from an extreme 
level of shipment smoothing appear to be those where orders are clumpy and customers 





or is “benefit from” the right word (possibly the firm would be better served by delivering 
more closely to the order date)? Somewhat surprising is the presence of a manufacturing 
bullwhip in some industries (presumably, some firms) which already exhibit a high degree 
of demand (and subsequently, shipment) variability – why do firms set manufacturing 
schedules that amplify this shipment variability even further? It may be due in part to 
climate (winter vs summer) and also due to Christmas and summer plant shutdowns. Also 
somewhat surprising is that firms that smooth manufacturing tend to further smooth orders, 
and vice versa. Again, by identifying these patterns, our research serves to motivate future 
research to further explore these propositions. 
With regard to time aggregation, similar to other researchers (e.g., Chen & Lee, 
2012) we find it tends to dampen the bullwhip if the ratio is greater than one at the shorter 
time aggregation level, but a new finding is that it amplifies the bullwhip if the ratio is less 
than one. Further, we show how seasonality may play a role in the differences between 
bullwhip ratios at various levels of temporal aggregation. Regarding the starting point of 
the time interval, an implication of our work for managers is that they should avoid masking 
the true bullwhip – masking occurs when peaks and valleys of a flow stream are aggregated 
into the same time bucket. For example, retailers should measure the quarterly bullwhip 
with a January start date, rather than February.  
Managerial implications of our work are summarized in the following advice that 
we might offer managers: 1) Track your intra-echelon bullwhips. We know of few 
managers who break down their flow streams in the manner we suggest – managers need 
to know exactly where variability (or smoothing) is induced within their firm (and by 





track your bullwhips, and an appropriate starting point for this interval (see above 
paragraph). 3) Understand what drives each of the intra-echelon bullwhips. The 
manufacturing bullwhip may be driven by the weather (e.g., higher output may be 
achievable in warm-weather months) or conversely, the firm may be able to achieve a 
manufacturing antibullwhip by implementing lean operations. But managers should 
understand the drivers of each of the intra-echelon bullwhips within their firm – and more 
broadly, their supply chain. 4) Rigorously track each intra-echelon bullwhip with an eye 
toward continuously driving it down, in an effort to achieve the “ideal” as described at the 
outset of section 3.2.  
Many complex factors contribute to the challenge facing managers in attempting to 
match supply with demand across a distributed supply chain. Understanding and managing 
the bullwhip effect is a complex and difficult task. Our work demonstrates the value of 
measuring and tracking various intra-echelon bullwhip effects in addition to the overall 
inter-echelon bullwhip. Specifically, our approach to decomposing the bullwhip provides 
guidance to firms seeking to better manage their shipping, manufacturing, and ordering 





























































































































Table 3.1:  Information Available in the Dataset 
  Manufacturing Set (number of industries) Retail Wholesale 
Variance Flow Stream A (52) A (10) B (23) B (11) C (11) C (3) (8) (21) 
𝑉𝐷
𝐹 Demand X X       
𝑉𝑆
𝐹 Shipment X X X X X X X X 
𝑉𝑀
𝐹 Manufacturing  X  X  X   
𝑉𝑂
𝐹 Orders placed  X       
𝑉𝐼






Table 3.2:  Results for the A Dataset 
 
 
Code Industry Month Qtr 6 Mo. Year Inflow Demand Month Qtr 6 Mo. Year Month Qtr 6 Mo. Year
A1 All Manufacturing with Unfilled Orders 0.38 0.48 1.22 0.87 0.80 0.83 0.40 0.80 2.49 1.29 0.96 0.59 0.49 0.68
A2 Aluminum and Nonferrous Metal Products 0.99 0.50 0.62 0.93 0.64 0.54 1.01 1.06 1.06 1.19 0.99 0.47 0.58 0.78
A3 Communications Equipment Manufacturing, Defense 0.93 0.44 0.26 0.41 0.17 0.31 5.26 4.37 3.44 1.90 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.22
A4 Communications Equipment Manufacturing, Nondefense 0.35 0.51 0.79 0.80 0.20 0.73 0.39 0.79 1.18 1.27 0.91 0.65 0.67 0.63
A5 Communications Equipment, Total 0.35 0.49 0.77 0.76 0.23 0.75 0.41 0.80 1.19 1.25 0.84 0.62 0.65 0.61
A6 Computer and Electronic Products 0.14 0.45 0.91 1.07 0.65 0.95 0.17 0.75 1.12 1.48 0.82 0.60 0.81 0.73
A7 Computers and Related Products 0.28 0.50 0.99 1.25 0.74 0.92 0.25 0.76 0.98 1.23 1.11 0.66 1.01 1.02
A8 Construction Machinery Manufacturing 0.73 0.56 0.95 1.08 0.53 0.32 1.36 1.04 1.17 1.28 0.54 0.54 0.81 0.84
A9 Construction Supplies 1.25 0.77 1.80 1.28 0.60 0.75 1.12 0.66 2.09 1.32 1.12 1.16 0.86 0.97
A10 Consumer Durable Goods 1.01 0.89 1.08 1.04 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.90 1.39 1.16 1.11 0.99 0.78 0.89
A11 Consumer Goods, Total 1.02 0.78 1.00 0.98 0.83 0.88 0.94 0.71 1.11 1.05 1.08 1.10 0.90 0.94
A12 Defense Aircraft and Parts 0.58 0.20 0.32 0.86 0.07 0.29 5.57 2.67 2.39 2.17 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.40
A13 Defense Capital Goods 0.17 0.06 0.21 0.54 0.13 0.50 2.10 2.14 2.95 3.54 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.15
A14 Durable Excluding Defense 0.60 0.73 1.32 1.03 0.88 0.88 0.51 0.72 2.15 1.30 1.17 1.02 0.61 0.79
A15 Durable Excluding Transportation 0.42 1.16 1.63 1.27 0.78 0.91 0.33 0.72 1.96 1.40 1.28 1.61 0.83 0.91
A16 Durable Goods Total 0.49 0.53 1.32 0.99 0.88 0.88 0.49 0.69 2.38 1.31 1.00 0.77 0.55 0.76
A17 Electric Lighting Equipment Manufacturing 0.43 0.89 1.46 1.07 0.49 0.67 0.44 1.22 1.74 1.45 0.96 0.73 0.84 0.74
A18 Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 0.70 1.70 1.38 1.02 0.32 0.58 0.53 2.57 2.57 1.30 1.32 0.66 0.54 0.79
A19 Electromedical, Measuring, and Control Instrument Mfg 0.48 1.24 2.08 1.03 0.49 0.77 0.41 2.20 3.08 1.47 1.19 0.56 0.68 0.70
A20 Electronic Computer Manufacturing 0.39 0.70 1.35 1.33 0.51 0.73 0.31 1.18 1.37 1.34 1.27 0.59 0.99 0.99
A21 Electronic Equipment, Appliances and Components 0.63 1.18 2.12 1.13 0.65 0.77 0.43 0.88 1.74 1.24 1.46 1.33 1.22 0.91
A22 Fabricated Metal Products 1.01 1.06 1.12 0.88 0.69 0.65 0.99 1.27 3.45 1.24 1.02 0.83 0.33 0.71
A23 Ferrous Metal Foundries 1.21 1.18 1.47 0.92 0.80 0.68 1.44 1.36 1.58 1.10 0.84 0.87 0.93 0.84
A24 Furniture and Related Products 1.10 0.83 1.46 1.73 0.65 0.60 1.13 1.51 1.46 1.83 0.98 0.55 1.00 0.94
A25 Household Appliance Manufacturing 0.69 1.39 2.96 0.96 0.51 0.46 0.55 1.21 3.21 1.22 1.26 1.15 0.92 0.79
A26 Industrial Machinery Manufacturing 0.23 0.93 1.01 0.90 0.18 0.46 0.30 1.64 1.66 1.46 0.78 0.56 0.61 0.62
A27 Information Technology Industries 0.17 0.44 0.92 0.97 0.74 0.95 0.18 0.62 1.03 1.33 0.93 0.71 0.89 0.73
A28 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy and Steel Products Mfg 0.81 0.36 0.41 1.91 0.25 0.44 1.32 1.32 1.09 1.75 0.61 0.27 0.37 1.09
A29 Machinery 0.57 1.21 1.80 1.26 0.63 0.73 0.44 0.94 1.90 1.38 1.31 1.29 0.95 0.91
A30 Manufacturing Excluding Defense 0.64 0.81 1.41 1.12 0.84 0.88 0.56 0.63 1.95 1.26 1.15 1.29 0.72 0.89
A31 Manufacturing Excluding Transportation 0.54 1.14 1.40 1.33 0.74 0.90 0.45 0.69 1.37 1.37 1.21 1.66 1.02 0.97
A32 Material Handling Equipment Manufacturing 0.33 0.45 0.72 1.17 0.39 0.48 1.16 1.48 1.30 1.37 0.29 0.30 0.55 0.86
A33 Metalworking Machinery Manufacturing 0.79 1.01 1.17 1.26 0.25 0.66 0.59 0.55 0.87 1.22 1.35 1.83 1.35 1.03
A34 Mining, Oil and Gas Field Machinery Manufacturing 2.10 3.08 1.59 0.67 0.30 0.20 3.96 10.22 4.19 1.28 0.53 0.30 0.38 0.52
A35 Motor Vehicle Bodies, Trailers and Parts 1.04 0.90 1.06 1.15 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.82 0.94 1.14 1.19 1.09 1.13 1.01
A36 Motor Vehicles and Parts 0.97 0.88 1.07 1.04 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.84 1.01 1.08 1.08 1.05 1.05 0.96
A37 Nondefense Aircraft and Parts 0.15 0.15 0.32 0.57 0.20 0.28 0.54 0.59 1.88 1.28 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.44
A38 Nondefense Capital Goods 0.18 0.34 1.03 0.80 0.75 0.86 0.17 0.48 1.95 1.27 1.06 0.70 0.53 0.63
A39 Nondefense Capital Goods Excluding Aircraft 0.22 0.70 1.56 1.16 0.78 0.92 0.18 0.63 1.80 1.37 1.22 1.11 0.86 0.85
A40 Nondurable Goods Total 0.90 1.22 1.10 1.27 0.61 0.80 0.90 1.22 1.10 1.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
A41 Other Durable Goods 0.92 0.69 0.98 1.30 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.69 0.86 1.49 1.19 1.00 1.14 0.87
A42 Other Electronic Component Manufacturing 0.69 1.02 0.80 0.92 0.16 0.36 0.84 1.27 1.24 1.68 0.83 0.80 0.64 0.55
A43 Photographic Equipment Manufacturing 1.54 0.67 0.88 1.19 0.40 0.49 1.47 0.55 0.88 1.23 1.05 1.22 1.00 0.96
A44 Primary Metals 0.83 0.34 0.39 1.10 0.59 0.63 0.87 0.86 0.85 1.28 0.96 0.39 0.45 0.86
A45 Search and Navigation Equipment Mfg Defense 0.15 0.21 0.38 0.87 0.21 0.42 2.31 2.50 3.05 2.99 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.29
A46 Search and Navigation Equipment Mfg Nondefense 1.23 0.65 1.06 0.82 0.16 0.30 5.09 8.71 4.62 2.31 0.24 0.07 0.23 0.35
A47 Ships and Boats, Total 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.19 0.35 0.21 1.26 1.26 1.75 0.77 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.24
A48 Total Capital Goods 0.13 0.16 1.03 0.75 0.73 0.84 0.17 0.44 1.97 1.30 0.77 0.37 0.52 0.58
A49 Total Manufacturing 0.55 0.71 1.43 1.13 0.84 0.89 0.53 0.63 2.06 1.26 1.04 1.13 0.69 0.89
A50 Transportation Equipment 0.55 0.36 1.14 1.01 0.89 0.74 0.79 0.73 1.39 0.98 0.70 0.49 0.82 1.03
A51 Turbines, Generators, & Other Power Transmission Equip 0.27 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.41 0.58 0.47 0.60 2.34 1.53 0.58 0.33 0.04 0.06
A52 Ventilation, Heating, Air-Cond, and Refrig Equip Mfg 0.79 1.06 1.38 1.82 0.55 0.53 0.76 1.12 2.96 1.57 1.05 0.95 0.47 1.16
Average: 0.65 0.75 1.09 1.02 1.06 1.44 1.87 1.43 0.89 0.74 0.67 0.75
Ratio > 1: 10 14 31 29 15 23 46 50 26 17 10 7
Ratio < 1: 42 38 21 23 37 29 6 2 26 35 42 45
T Statistics -2.65*** -3.21*** -5.88*** -5.08*** -2.17** -4.28*** -7.13*** -7.01***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1












Table 3.4:  Results for the B Dataset  
 
 
Code Industry Shipment Mfg. Order Inflow 
A6 Computer and Electronic Products 0.82 0.39 0.53 0.84
A16 Durable Goods Total 1.00 0.65 0.76 0.99
A21 Electronic Equipment, Appliances and Components 1.46 0.54 0.72 1.11
A22 Fabricated Metal Products 1.02 1.04 1.02 0.94
A24 Furniture and Related Products 0.98 1.19 0.88 1.07
A29 Machinery 1.31 0.57 0.72 1.06
A40 Nondurable Goods Total 1.00 0.79 1.12 1.02
A44 Primary Metals 0.96 0.86 1.16 0.87
A49 Total Manufacturing 1.04 0.64 0.81 1.03
A50 Transportation Equipment 0.70 0.88 1.01 0.89
T Statistics 0.42 -3.17*** -1.99** -0.62
Correlation -0.30 0.69** -0.17














Code Industry Monthly Quarterly Semiann. Yearly Inflow Sales
B1 Apparel 0.57 0.60 0.34 1.62 0.71 0.88 0.65
B2 Basic Chemicals 0.74 1.01 1.57 1.07 0.28 0.73 0.66
B3 Beverage and Tobacco Products 2.17 3.37 4.04 0.63 0.28 0.42 1.19
B4 Beverage Manufacturing 3.04 1.28 2.01 1.10 0.39 0.80
B5 Consumer Nondurable Goods 1.11 1.36 1.05 1.55 0.64 0.75
B6 Dairy Product Manufacturing 0.85 1.93 2.06 1.13 0.45 0.70
B7 Food Products 1.32 1.67 2.50 1.09 0.71 0.81 0.92
B8 Grain and Oilseed Milling 2.90 2.81 1.78 1.05 0.61 0.44
B9 Leather and Allied Products 0.79 0.88 0.98 2.89 0.16 0.68 0.59
B10 Meat, Poultry and Seafood Product Processing 1.08 0.87 1.00 1.07 0.49 0.54
B11 Paint, Coating and Adhesive Manufacturing 1.47 0.98 2.44 0.93 0.60 0.64
B12 Paper Products 0.99 1.26 1.20 1.09 0.30 0.56 0.82
B13 Paperboard Container Manufacturing 1.40 1.98 1.65 1.18 0.19 0.56
B14 Pesticide, Fertilizer & Other Ag. Chemical Mfg 0.66 0.52 0.55 1.18 0.62 0.81
B15 Petroleum and Coal Products 2.95 1.46 0.96 1.19 0.22 0.40 1.84
B16 Petroleum Refineries 2.88 1.58 1.06 1.13 0.20 0.37
B17 Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing 2.86 2.17 1.87 1.30 0.16 0.52
B18 Plastics and Rubber Products 0.99 0.87 1.40 1.38 0.59 0.78 1.01
B19 Printing 1.59 0.43 0.29 1.42 0.50 0.76 0.99
B20 Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills 1.20 1.07 1.04 1.34 0.20 0.34
B21 Textile Products 1.12 1.42 2.52 1.66 0.62 0.83 0.96
B22 Textiles 0.57 1.48 2.36 1.00 0.78 0.89 0.70
B23 Tobacco Manufacturing 3.09 25.22 16.56 0.90 0.22 0.21
Average: 1.58 2.44 2.23 1.26
Ratio > 1: 15 16 18 19























Code Industry Monthly Quarterly Semiann. Yearly Inflow Sales
C1 Audio and Video Equipment Mfg. 0.86 0.62 0.79 1.94 0.31 0.68
C2 Automobile Manufacturing 0.90 0.87 1.08 1.05 0.89 0.91
C3 Battery Manufacturing 1.06 0.58 0.49 1.28 0.49 0.76
C4 Computer Storage Device Mfg. 0.20 0.94 1.00 1.02 0.49 0.95
C5 Farm Machinery and Equipment Mfg. 0.88 0.74 0.81 1.13 0.51 0.68
C6 Heavy Duty Truck Manufacturing 1.13 1.22 1.19 1.09 0.67 0.66
C7 Light Truck and Utility Vehicle Mfg. 0.97 0.88 1.05 1.02 0.87 0.87
C8 Miscellaneous Products 0.65 0.68 2.79 1.38 0.58 0.88 0.73
C9 Nonmetallic Mineral Products 0.79 0.53 0.63 1.01 0.60 0.75 0.72
C10 Other Computer Peripheral Equip. Mfg. 0.31 0.58 0.69 1.16 0.75 0.92
C11 Wood Products 1.26 0.93 2.43 1.51 0.60 0.75 0.94
Average: 0.82 0.78 1.18 1.24
Ratio > 1: 3 1 5 11





Code Industry Monthly Quarterly Semiann. Yearly Inflow Sales
Retail Total 0.50 0.67 1.03 0.99 0.82 0.95
R1 Building Material and Garden Equip. & Supplies Dealers 0.94 0.55 1.58 1.62 0.74 0.81
R2 Clothing and Clothing Accessory Stores 0.35 0.23 0.56 1.52 0.82 0.99
R3 Department Stores 0.34 0.33 0.83 0.96 0.89 0.99
R4 Food and Beverage Stores 0.98 1.56 1.78 1.05 0.86 0.89
R5 Furniture, Home Furnishings, Electronics & Appliance Stores 0.63 1.02 1.40 1.45 0.71 0.97
R6 General Merchandise Stores 0.29 0.33 0.80 1.26 0.88 0.97
R7 Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 1.86 0.50 0.70 1.03 0.66 0.59
R8 Total (excl. motor vehicle and parts dealers) 0.34 0.53 0.97 1.07 0.87 0.97
Average: 0.69 0.63 1.07 1.22
Ratio > 1: 1 2 4 7











Table 3.8:  T-Test Statistics for Bullwhip Ratio Time Aggregation Comparisons 
 
Code Industry Monthly Quarterly Semiann. Yearly Inflow Sales
Total 1.143 1.366 1.671 1.169 0.64 0.64
W1 Apparel,Piece Goods,and Notions 1.235 0.895 0.942 1.623 0.47 0.76
W2 Beer, Wine, and Distilled Alcoholic Beverages 0.572 0.581 0.345 1.122 0.54 0.81
W3 Chemicals and Allied Products 1.485 0.989 1.430 1.071 0.27 0.46
W4 Computer and Computer Peripheral Equip. & Software 1.011 1.164 1.000 0.953 0.74 0.83
W5 Drugs and Druggists' Sundries 4.152 2.884 3.532 1.098 0.67 0.46
W6 Durable Goods 0.869 0.799 0.745 1.208 0.60 0.69
W7 Electrical and Electronic Goods 0.990 1.019 0.863 1.282 0.37 0.65
W8 Farm Product Raw Materials 3.450 3.240 6.633 0.826 0.66 0.48
W9 Furniture and Home Furnishings 1.450 1.165 0.635 1.192 0.40 0.62
W10 Grocery and Related Products 1.393 1.398 1.346 1.177 0.59 0.65
W11 Hardware, and Plumbing and Heating Equip. & Supplies 1.167 0.805 1.062 1.482 0.33 0.56
W12 Lumber and Other Construction Materials 1.114 0.697 0.668 1.430 0.55 0.61
W13 Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies 1.241 1.125 3.022 1.344 0.53 0.66
W14 Metals and Minerals, for example, Petroleum 1.497 1.242 1.436 1.446 0.48 0.55
W15 Miscellaneous Durable Goods 1.145 0.933 0.841 1.231 0.41 0.65
W16 Miscellaneous Nondurable Goods 1.419 0.567 0.426 1.087 0.39 0.63
W17 Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Parts and Supplies 1.109 0.949 1.854 1.062 0.30 0.68
W18 Nondurable Goods 1.609 2.802 5.950 1.192 0.64 0.58
W19 Paper and Paper Products 1.672 1.469 1.167 0.898 0.51 0.54
W20 Petroleum and Petroleum Products 1.355 1.382 1.036 1.058 0.36 0.46
W21 Professional and Commercial Equipment and Supplies 1.068 1.378 1.079 1.001 0.69 0.75
Average: 1.461 1.311 1.713 1.180
Ratio > 1: 19 13 14 19
Ratio < 1: 3 9 8 3
Bullwhip: Seasonality ratios𝐵∗∗
𝐹
>1 <1 >1 <1 >1 <1 >1 <1 >1 <1
A Data 1.10 -2.91*** -1.27 -7.89*** 3.93*** -3.93*** -0.01 -5.91*** 1.13 -9.78***
B Data -0.78 -1.85** 0.75 -1.21 1.78** -3.62** -0.74 -2.21** 3.35*** -2.83**
C Data NA -0.31 NA -1.88** 1.76* -3.25** NA -1.51* NA -3.75***
Retail NA -0.97 NA -4.74*** 0.92 -2.56** NA -8.64*** NA -5.98***
Wholesale 1.52* NA -1.60 -1.02 2.33** -10.87*** -1.01 4.71 1.85** -4.96**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NA = not applicable due to sample size of less than four.
> 1 covers scenarios where the bullwhip ratio > 1 at the shorter time interval.
< 1 covers scenarios where the bullwhip ratio < 1 at the shorter time interval.
      for A Data;       for others.








Table 3.9:  Impact of Seasonality on Aggregated Bullwhip Ratio 
 
The numbers in the table show the fraction of industries that have a lower (higher) 
aggregated bullwhip ratio when inflow is more (less) seasonal than demand.  
 
 
Table 3.10:  T-Test Statistics for Bullwhip Comparisons for Different Fiscal Year Starts 
 
 
Monthly vs. Quarterly vs. Monthly vs. Monthly vs.
Quarterly Yearly Semiannually Yearly
Manufacturing 57% 67% 58% 71%
Retail 67% 78% 100% 100%
Wholesale 41% 73% 23% 55%
Total 55% 69% 55% 70%
Jan ≠ Feb Jan ≠ Mar Feb ≠ Mar
A Data -4.84*** -2.52*** 5.22***
B Data 0.62 1.62* 3.34***
C Data -2.06** -2.09** 1.53*
Retail -0.46 -2.48** -2.47**
Wholesale -0.75 -0.35 0.20
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1








BULLWHIP EFFECT IN A PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A significant advancement in supply chain management in the past three decades is 
the identification and management of the bullwhip effect. In a seminal paper, Lee et al. 
(1997a) define the bullwhip effect as “the phenomenon where orders to the supplier tend 
to have larger variance than sales to the buyer (i.e., demand distortion), and the distortion 
propagates upstream in an amplified form (i.e., variance amplification)” (p. 546). The 
bullwhip effect has been observed in many firms and industries: Barilla’s pasta supply 
chain (Hammond, 1994), machine tool industry (Anderson et al., 2000), European 
convenience foods supply chain (Fransoo & Wouters, 2000), a supermarket chain in Spain 
(Lai, 2005), Philips electronics (De Kok et al., 2005), semiconductor equipment industry 
(Terwiesch et al., 2005), and U.S. industries (Cachon et al., 2007).
 The bullwhip effect leads to significant supply chain inefficiencies such as 
excessive capital investment in inventory, mismatched production schedules, poor 
customer service, lost revenues, misguided capacity planning, and additional transportation 
costs (e.g., Sterman, 1989; Lee et al., 1997b; Jin et al., 2015a). As a result, taming the 
bullwhip has attracted much attention from both researchers and practitioners. For example, 





to mitigate its detrimental impact. 
Although there is a growing literature of empirical studies on the bullwhip effect, 
there are several challenges in empirical investigation of the effect. First, Chen and Lee 
(2012) point out that two major definitions of bullwhip effect measurement have been used 
in the literature: information-based definition and material-based definition. The 
information-based definition originating from Lee et al. (1997a) compares order variance 
with demand variance. It has been widely used in theoretical analysis. The material-based 
definition that is used in most empirical studies compares the variance of order receipts 
with that of sales. These two definitions differ in concept and are not necessarily good 
approximations of each other. Hence, empirical studies on bullwhip effect using material-
based definition may not have a direct bearing on the theoretical models that use 
information-based definition. Second, analytical analysis of the bullwhip effect is usually 
based on a single product and order decision period. However, due to data availability 
issues, most empirical studies measure the bullwhip effect based on aggregated products 
and aggregated time to a month or longer. Measuring the bullwhip effect in aggregate data 
may cause potential biases in estimation (Chen & Lee, 2012). Whether aggregation 
amplifies, preserves, or dampens the bullwhip effect is an important question to explore. 
For example, if the data aggregation masks the bullwhip effect, then the managers who 
make financial planning and investment decisions based on quarterly or yearly firm-level 
data will probably overlook the severity of monthly product-level bullwhip effect. But it is 
monthly information at product level that defines much of a firm’s operations management. 
Third, the bullwhip effect is a phenomenon on the entire supply chain. Bullwhip effect 





the supply chain to keep track of individual products. It is a formidable task to collect this 
information. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work manages to do this.  
We address these empirical challenges by analyzing a proprietary dataset collected 
from a multiechelon pharmaceutical supply chain and make the following contributions to 
the literature. First, we measure the bullwhip effect based on information flows and 
compare it with that based on material flows. Second, we report the bullwhip effect in a 
supply chain at the product level and in fine time buckets such as monthly as defined in 
analytical papers. Third, we explore how data aggregation affects the bullwhip 
measurement. Specifically, we investigate whether product aggregation and temporal 
aggregation preserve or mask the bullwhip effect. Fourth, we measure the bullwhip effect 
across different echelons of a supply chain, rather than across a compilation of individual 
firms or industries. Fifth, we examine some drivers of the bullwhip effect such as price 
fluctuation, replenishment lead time, and inventory.                          
Our key findings are the following: (1) Distributors exhibit a prevalent and 
intensive bullwhip effect. (2) Manufacturer exhibits a less intensive bullwhip effect than 
distributors and makes production smoother than demand for some products. (3) The 
bullwhip measure based on order receipt variance underestimates the one based on order 
variance. (4) Products that have a flatter demand are more likely to exhibit the bullwhip 
effect. (5) Product aggregation and time aggregation tend to mask the bullwhip effect in 
some cases. (6) Price variation, inventory, and replenishment lead time are three prominent 
factors related to the bullwhip effect. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief survey 





empirical context and data. We present our analysis in section 4.5. Section 4.6 offers some 
concluding comments. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
Since Forrester (1961) first identifies the bullwhip effect in a series of case studies, 
the phenomenon has been widely studied in the economics and operations management 
literatures. In general, the economics literature on supply chain variability precedes the 
work in operations management. Economists discuss supply chain volatility in terms of 
production smoothing hypothesis, which states that a firm can use inventory as a buffer to 
smooth its production relative to its sales. This argument suggests that production is less 
volatile than demand. Production smoothing is desirable for a firm if it is less costly to 
maintain production at a relatively stable level than to vary the production level, possibly 
because the production cost function is convex or because changing the rate of production 
is expensive. Although the intuition behind production smoothing is simple and fascinating, 
the majority of the empirical studies show the opposite result: Production is more variable 
than sales (e.g., Blinder, 1981; Blanchard, 1983; Miron & Zeldes, 1988; Krane & Braun, 
1991; Kahn, 1992; Rossana, 1998). To explain the discrepancy between theory and 
observation, some economists (e.g., Fair, 1989; Ghali, 1987) argue that there are problems 
with the data used in the empirical analysis of production smoothing: Data are measured 
in monetary units rather than physical units and are seasonally adjusted. Other economists 
(e.g., Caplin, 1985; Blinder, 1986; Kahn, 1987) argue that there are problems with the 
theory itself, and show that production is actually more variable than sales under certain 





Lee et al. (1997a) approach the bullwhip phenomenon from a managerial 
perspective as opposed to a macroeconomics aspect and popularize the term in the 
operations management literature. In a seminal paper (1997a), these same authors define 
the bullwhip effect in supply chain context and identify four causes of the effect: demand 
signal processing, price fluctuation, order batching, and rationing game. There is a growing 
operations management literature of the theoretical studies on the bullwhip effect after the 
work of Lee et al. (1997a). Cachon (1999) show that order variance of retailers can be 
reduced when the retailers’ order interval is lengthened or when their batch size is reduced. 
Chen et al. (2000) quantify the bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain that is due to 
the effects of demand forecasting and order lead times, and show that information sharing 
can reduce, but not completely eliminate, the bullwhip effect. Chen and Lee (2012) develop 
a general modeling framework to explain various observations in previous empirical 
studies and show that data aggregation across products or over long time periods masks the 
bullwhip effect. Many researchers from operations management discipline have conducted 
empirical investigations on the bullwhip effect. Hammond (1994) reports large fluctuations 
of weekly orders in Barilla’s pasta supply chain. Anderson et al. (2000) find substantial 
volatility in the machine tool industry and attribute it to the bullwhip effect. Fransoo and 
Wouters (2000) discuss several important issues in measuring the bullwhip effect and find 
the existence of the bullwhip effect at different echelons in two food supply chains in the 
Netherlands. Terwiesch et al. (2005) find that the semiconductor equipment industry is 
more volatile than the personal computer industry. Lai (2005), using monthly data on 3,754 
stock keeping units (SKUs) from the distribution center of a supermarket chain in Spain, 





driver of the effect. Cachon et al. (2007) analyze the bullwhip effect using a wide panel of 
U.S. industries and find that retail industries and most manufacturing industries do not 
exhibit a bullwhip effect, but wholesale industries exhibit the effect. Bray and Mendelson 
(2012) examine the bullwhip effect in a sample of 4,689 public U.S. firms, and find that 
two-thirds of firms show the bullwhip effect and information transmission lead time 
contributes to the effect. Shan et al. (2014) investigate the bullwhip effect in China using a 
dataset of over 1,200 public companies from 2002 to 2009, and find that more than two-
thirds of the companies experience the bullwhip effect. 
Our study fits within the stream of empirical studies, but it differs from the previous 
works in several ways. First, we use monthly and item-level data, whereas most of prior 
studies use aggregate data at firm/industry level and at monthly/quarterly level. These finer 
levels of data, which define much of a firm’s operations management, enable us to explore 
the impact of data aggregation on the bullwhip effect measurement. Second, we obtain 
order information that is not available in previous studies. We measure the bullwhip effect 
based on information flow (order) and compare it with the one based on material flow 
(order receipt). By doing this, we empirically test the analytical results derived by Chen 
and Lee (2012) and investigate the difference between information-based bullwhip 
definition that is widely used in theoretical studies and material-based definition that is 
used in most empirical studies. Third, we collect item-level data for all firms in a linear 
supply chain, and therefore we can make comparisons across different echelons of the 
supply chain, whereas prior works are generally not able to construct linear supply chains 
and have to study firms or industries without knowing their customers or suppliers. We are 





chain. Our results have a direct bearing on the original bullwhip effect defined by Lee et 
al. (1997a).                                   
 
4.3 Bullwhip Effect Measurement and Hypotheses 
We use the terms “demand,” “sales,” “order,” and “order receipt” for a typical firm 
in the remainder of this chapter. Their meanings are as follows: demand refers to the order 
received by the firm from its customers; sales refers to the shipments from the firm to its 
customers; order refers to the order placed by the firm to its suppliers; order receipt refers 
to the shipment received by the firm from its suppliers. Following the original definition 
of the bullwhip effect by Lee et al. (1997a), we define 
 




where 𝑉[ ] is the variance operator. The numerator and denominator are the variance of 
order series and demand series of a single product or a group of products. We say that the 
bullwhip effect is exhibited when the ratio is greater than one. As described before, this 
definition is based on information flow. Due to data availability, some researchers use order 
receipt as a proxy for order and use sales as a proxy for demand (e.g., Bray & Mendelson, 
2012; Cachon et al., 2007; Shan et al., 2014). If the order receipt information is not 
available, it is inferred from the inventory and sales data. The resulting bullwhip ratio is 
material-based bullwhip measure.      
 Chen and Lee (2012) argue that bullwhip measurement based on information flow 
(order) may be different from the measurement based on material flow (order receipt). 
These two measurements account for different levels of decision effects. The order 





outcome of the decision process. The bullwhip effect based on material flow is the 
consequence of that based on information flow. Chen and Lee (2012) show analytically 
that the variance of order receipt sequence is less than that of order sequence. The intuition 
is that the downstream orders are truncated by the upstream order-fulfillment capacity, so 
the order receipt stream appears less variable. Using the order receipt data as a proxy for 
the order data will underestimate the original order variance. We therefore formulate the 
following hypothesis:   
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1). The bullwhip ratio based on order receipt variance is lower 
than that based on order variance.           
 Researchers in economics and operations management have explored the impact of 
data aggregation across products. Caplin (1985) shows that aggregation across products 
preserves the bullwhip effect under (𝑆, 𝑠)  inventory policy no matter the correlation 
structure of demand. Fransoo and Wouters (2000) show that the same basic data can lead 
to different bullwhip measurements, dependent on the sequence of aggregation. Cachon et 
al. (2007) write that “Whether aggregation preserves or masks the bullwhip effect or 
production smoothing depends on the correlation of production and demand across the 
units being aggregate (firms, products, etc.) and on the particular causes of amplification 
in place” (p. 477). Using a theoretical model, Chen and Lee (2012) give a rigorous 
treatment of the product aggregation issue, and show that the bullwhip effect tends to be 
masked under product aggregation. We propose the following hypothesis:    
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2). The bullwhip ratio is smaller at the group/family level than 
at the individual product level.  





measure through specific assumptions on the order and demand distribution function. 
However, there is usually no information on the distribution function when researchers 
conduct empirical investigations on the bullwhip effect. We need to determine an 
appropriate time window (e.g., weekly, monthly, or quarterly) to calculate the variances of 
order and demand. Fransoo and Wouters (2000) suggest that the appropriate aggregation 
over time should depend on the specific problem under study. Chen and Lee (2012) argue 
that it is important to measure bullwhip effect at the appropriate time unit for supply chain 
cost assessment purposes. Chen and Lee (2012) develop an analytical model to demonstrate 
that “aggregating data over relatively long time periods can mask the bullwhip effect” (p. 
772). More specifically, they show that under a first-order autoregressive moving average 
(ARMA (1, 1)) demand model, if the bullwhip ratio is greater than one, then the ratio will 
decrease monotonically to one as the aggregated time period increases. Thus, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3). The bullwhip ratio decreases as the aggregation time period 
increases. 
 Lee et al. (1997a) define the bullwhip effect as a supply chain phenomenon where 
the demand variability increases from downstream echelons to upstream echelons. 
Empirical findings are mixed. Hammond (1994) reports large fluctuations of order 
quantities in Barilla’s pasta supply chain. Lee et al. (1997b) observe amplified volatility in 
orders in diaper supply chain of Procter and Gamble and in Hewlett-Pachard’s printer 
supply chain. However, Cachon et al. (2007) find that retail industries and most 
manufacturing industries do not exhibit the bullwhip effect, but the wholesale industries 





echelon) do not experience greater demand variance than retail industries (downstream 
echelon). We construct a linear supply chain from our unique dataset and explore whether 
the demand variability amplifies along this three-echelon supply chain. We therefore test 
the following hypothesis:           
HYPOTHESIS 4 (H4). The firm at upstream stage experiences a larger demand 
variability than that at downstream stage. 
 Price fluctuation is identified as a cause of the bullwhip effect in prior literature. 
Blinder (1986) proposes the cost shocks as an explanation for the empirical observation 
that industry-level production is more volatile than sales. Lee et al. (1997a) analytically 
show that manufacturer’s wholesale price variation generates the bullwhip effect for the 
retailer. Sodhi et al. (2014) incorporate stochastic purchase price into economic order 
quantity model and show that price variance is positively related to the bullwhip effect. 
Manufacturer’s trade promotion (i.e., wholesale price discounts) is one form of price 
variation. When manufacturer offers discounts to the retailer, the retailer will evaluate the 
trade-off between purchase cost and inventory cost. If the end consumer demand becomes 
flatter, indicating that the demand is very predictable, the retailer can easily compare the 
marginal saving with the marginal holding cost of an extra unit. So there is more room for 
the retailer to stockpile in order to take advantage of manufacturer’s discounts. When the 
end consumer demand becomes more variable, the cost evaluation will be more 
complicated and imply more risk because the demand tends to be unpredictable. It is less 
likely for the retailer to make a risky inventory investment in this scenario; thus, the 
retailer’s order more closely follows consumer demand. Zotteri (2013) shows that the 





manufacturer in our dataset provides periodic discounts to the distributors, so we expect to 
observe similar results. We formulate the following hypotheses:           
HYPOTHESIS 5 (H5). The bullwhip ratio is positively associated with price 
variation. 
HYPOTHESIS 6 (H6). The bullwhip ratio is negatively associated with the demand 
variability.   
 Forrester (1961) identifies that the delay in information and material flow (i.e., lead 
time) is a source of demand amplification. By using an inventory model with constant 
replenishment lead time 𝑙 and autoregressive demand process (𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡), Lee 
et al. (1997a) derive the bullwhip ratio as follows: 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 1 +
2𝜌(1 − 𝜌𝑙+1)(1 − 𝜌𝑙+2)
1 − 𝜌
 (4.2) 
They argue that the bullwhip ratio increases in the lead time, as do Agrawal et al. (2009), 
Chen et al. (2000), and Steckel et al. (2009). These authors all assume that replenishment 
lead time is constant. Modelling lead time as a random variable is more approximate to the 
uncertainty of real-life logistics. Chatfield et al. (2004), Duc et al. (2008), and Kim et al. 
(2006) show that order variability increases with variability of lead time. The behavioral 
experiment conducted by Ancarani et al. (2013) supports this result. We test the following 
hypothesis:          
HYPOTHESIS 7 (H7). There is a positive association between the bullwhip ratio 
and replenishment lead time.  
 Inventory is an important factor related to the bullwhip effect. For example, when 
distributors decide how much to order in each period to meet demand for their products, 





distributors to forward buy and thus result in bullwhip effect. But a higher inventory level 
causes distributors to order less to avoid additional holding cost, resulting in a lower 
bullwhip effect. Experimental studies identify managers’ bounded rationality and sub-
optimal decisions as a behavioral cause of the bullwhip effect (e.g., Sterman, 1989; Croson 
& Donohue, 2006). Over-reaction to demand changes is one of the managers’ errors in 
decision making for inventory replenishment. Waston and Zheng (2008) show that 
manager’s overreaction to demand signals can result in an increase in volatility of the 
system’s replenishment orders. If a firm carries high inventory, the managers will be less 
likely to place an inflated order when seeing a demand spike. Hence, inventory helps 
mitigate the bullwhip effect. Baganha and Cohen (1998) develop an analytical model to 
show that inventories can have a stabilizing effect on the replenishment orders. Bray and 
Mendelson (2012) analytically illustrate that “the firm can reduce the bullwhip effect by 
increasing product shelf life: a longer shelf life means a lower holding cost, which means 
the firm carries a higher safety stock, which in turn means it reacts more calmly to demand 
spikes” (p. 863). We use inventory to sales ratio (inventory ratio for short) to compare 
inventory levels among SKUs and distributors. Our next hypothesis is as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 8 (H8). The inventory ratio is negatively associated with the 
bullwhip ratio. 
 
4.4 Empirical Context and Data 
We use a proprietary dataset from a multiechelon pharmaceutical supply chain for 
our empirical analysis. To the best of our knowledge, no prior empirical studies on the 





one manufacturer and six nation-wide distributors (A-F). The structure of the supply chain 
and of the data is shown in Figure 4.1. This supply chain structure matches the one that is 
widely used in theoretical studies on the bullwhip effect (e.g., Lee et al., 1997a; Cachon, 
1999). The manufacturer produces consumable products that all medical practitioners in 
this specialty use, and has a lion’s share of the market. These products are used on patients 
in medical practitioners’ office and have a shelf life of approximately 18 months. In order 
to meet sales targets, the manufacturer may periodically offer price discounts to its 
distributors, for example, at the end of the manufacturer’s fiscal quarter.    
We collect monthly data on 31 SKUs between January 2010 and June 2014. Since 
the frequency of the data (monthly) matches the frequency of order decisions made by the 
manufacturer and distributors, the data avoid the “time-disaggregation bias” identified by 
Kahn (1992), and are suitable for appropriate supply chain cost assessment (Chen & Lee, 
2012). The entire product category is made up of these 31 SKUs. SKUs 1-11 are carried by 
all distributors. SKUs 12-15, 16-19, 20-23, 24-26, 27-28, and 29-31 are carried only by 
distributors A-F, respectively. Manufacturer offers price discounts for 2 SKUs (SKUs 1 and 
2), which account for 40% of the total sales. All 31 SKUs have annual wholesale price 
increase. Specifically, we use the following data to conduct empirical analysis: 
manufacturer’s production, manufacturer’s sales (distributors’ order receipts), 
manufacturer’s raw material orders to the suppliers, manufacturer’s raw material receipts 
from the suppliers, distributors’ orders (manufacturer’s demand), and distributors’ sales. In 
general, sales is a censored variable and not the same as demand because it is equal to the 
minimum of demand and inventory on hand. Both our interview with the industry expert 





match the orders from the practitioners. Hence, it is reasonable to assume for our dataset 
that distributors’ sales are equivalent to their demand. Table 4.1 presents summary statistics 
by distributor for the orders and sales variables used in our study. We do not have access 
to the inventory data at distributors, so we estimate inventories using the following 
relationship:  
 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑡 −  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 (4.3) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡  denotes the net inventories at the end of period 𝑡 . Since initial 
inventories are not available, we choose them so that each period’s inventory is greater 
than or equal to zero. Thus, the inventory data used in our analysis are relative inventory. 
Similar approach has been used by Blattberg and Levin (1987). We measure quantities in 
physical units rather than dollar amounts. This avoids measurement and accounting 
problems associated with inventory evaluation (Lai, 2005). The Dickey-Fuller test suggests 
that none of the data series presents a unit root, indicating that all data series are stationary. 
Therefore, we do not make any adjustment to each series. Figure 4.2 shows sales and orders 
of SKU 2 at distributor F. We observe that the distributor’s sales have much less variability 
than its orders, indicating that the bullwhip effect exists. We notice that the distributor 
places significant large orders during price discount periods and there is usually a trough 
in orders after a price discount ends. This implies that the manufacturer’s price promotions 
make the distributor’s orders more volatile than its sales and therefore leads to the bullwhip 
effect.   
   
4.5 Analysis 





bullwhip effect exists at each distributor. The average ratio is 22.88 (ranging from 1.13 to 
216.67), much higher than those reported in the previous literature. Not all SKUs at 
manufacturer exhibit the bullwhip effect, indicating that the manufacturer makes 
production smoother than demand to some extent. The magnitude of the bullwhip ratios is 
usually smaller at manufacturer than at distributors. The manufacturer (upstream firm) that 
is supposed to suffer more from the bullwhip effect actually experiences a less severe 
bullwhip effect than the distributors (downstream firm). Recall that manufacturer offers 
price promotions for SKUs 1 and 2. The bullwhip ratios of these two SKUs at six 
distributors are usually much larger than those of other SKUs, which implies that price 
variation is a possible cause of the bullwhip effect. The interesting thing is that SKUs 1 
and 2 at manufacturer have bullwhip ratios less than one. Our discussions with managers 
of the manufacturer show that the factory operation prepares for the demand peaks caused 
by the price promotions and is able to fulfill these demands from inventory in most cases. 
Our findings at SKU level are similar to those obtained by Cachon et al. (2007) at industry 
level.             
 Table 4.3 shows the bullwhip ratios measured by order variance and order receipt 
variance for each SKU at distributors A-F. We find that the majority of SKUs at distributors 
A, B, D, E, and F have a higher bullwhip ratio measured by order variance than that 
measured by order receipt variance. Furthermore, paired t-tests (Table 4.4) show that 
distributors A, B, D, and E have a statistically significantly higher bullwhip ratio measured 
by variance of orders. We find strong evidence in support of H1. This result suggests that 
the bullwhip measure based on material flow underestimates the one based on information 





 We report the results for product aggregation in Table 4.5. In order to create 
different degrees of aggregation, we merge similar products that are in the same group, and 
then merge products alike that are in the same family. Two products belong to a group if 
they have the common main chemical components with the same concentration. Two 
products are in a family if their primary chemical components are the same. The degree of 
aggregation over family is higher than that over group in our research context. Paired t-
tests (Table 4.6) indicate that bullwhip ratios at group/family level are statistically 
significantly smaller than those at the SKU level for manufacturer and distributor C. There 
is some evidence in support of H2. We use results from prior theoretical studies on bullwhip 
effect to generate H2. All these analytical models assume some form of inventory model 
and demand structure. These assumptions seem not to be applicable to our study. Hence, 
we develop a two-product analytical model without making any specific assumption to 
further investigate the product aggregation issue. The model in given in the Appendix. We 
show that how the bullwhip ratios change under product aggregation depends on the 
relationship between covariance of orders and that of demand. We test our model using 
SKUs 1 and 2. The results are consistent with the model’s predictions.              
 Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the results for time aggregation. We measure the effect of 
temporal aggregation by increasing the level of aggregation from monthly, to quarterly, to 
semiannually. The bullwhip ratios become statistically significantly smaller as the level of 
time aggregation changes from monthly to semiannually for manufacturer, and distributors 
B and E. We find mild evidence in support of H3.     
 We report the bullwhip ratios along the entire supply chain in Table 4.9. Our unique 





comparisons across different levels of the supply chain. The average bullwhip ratio is 28.59 
(ranging from 0.13 to 132.17) for the entire supply chain, indicating that the bullwhip effect 
is prevalent. The majority of 31 SKUs have bullwhip ratios greater than one at distributors 
and manufacturer. T-test results show that manufacturer experiences a larger demand 
variance than the distributors. Hence, H4 is supported.            
 To test hypotheses H5-H8, we develop the following econometric model: 
 𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 
           + 𝛽4𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑗  +  ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖
𝑖=𝐴,…,𝐸
 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗 
(4.4) 
Where 𝑖 denotes distributor, and 𝑗 denotes SKU. There are four explanatory variables with 
each corresponding to a hypothesis. 𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 is the standard deviation of wholesale price. 
In order to control for the range of price changes, we normalize the wholesale price using 
the formula 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 =
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛
 . 𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 is the coefficient of variation of 
demand. 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 is the average number of days between placing an order and receiving 
the ordered product. 𝐼𝑅 is the inventory ratio, which is calculated as the ratio of average 
inventory to average sales. We include dummy variables 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 to control for fixed 
distributor effect. The variance inflation factor values for all explanatory variables are 
between 1.43 and 2.26, which are lower than the cutoff value of 10 (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Multicollinearity is not a problem. Estimation results are presented in Table 4.10.     
 The coefficient for 𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 is positive and significant, indicating that a greater 
price variation is correlated with a higher bullwhip ratio. H5 is supported. This finding 
provides empirical support to the analytical work by Lee et al. (1997a) and Sodhi et al. 





demand variability is correlated with a lower bullwhip ratio. We find strong evidence to 
support H6. When demand becomes more predictable, the bullwhip effect is more likely to 
occur. Table 4.11 shows the correlation coefficients between bullwhip ratio and coefficient 
of variation of demand. All coefficients are negative and those for distributors D, E, and F 
are statistically significant.   
 As shown in Table 4.10, the coefficient for 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 is positive and significant. 
This implies that a longer order lead time is associated with a higher bullwhip ratio. We 
find strong evidence in support of H7. Table 4.12 shows the correlation coefficients 
between replenishment lead time and bullwhip ratio. We find that there is a positive 
association between bullwhip ratio and lead time for distributor A, B, D, and E. The 
coefficient for 𝐼𝑅 is negative and significant, indicating that a higher inventory is correlated 
with a lower bullwhip ratio. H8 is supported. We report the correlation coefficients between 
inventory ratio and bullwhip ratio for distributors in Table 4.13. We find that there is a 
statistically significantly negative association between inventory ratio and bullwhip ratio 
for distributors A, D, and F, and there is a negative but not significant relationship for 
distributor E.     
A firm will not exhibit a bullwhip effect if it operates in a perfectly-matched fashion. 
That is, the firm’s shipment (i.e., sales to customers) stream coincides with the demand 
(i.e., orders received from the customers) stream; the shipments come directly out of a just-
in-time manufacturing stream, indicating that there is no need to hold finished goods 
inventory; the firm places raw material orders with its supplier by exactly following the 
manufacturing stream, and the supplier fulfills these orders instantaneously, resulting in no 





strategy, the entire chain will not exhibit a bullwhip effect.          
However, we find not only prevalent but also intensive bullwhip effects in our 
dataset. To better understand the bullwhip effect in a firm and along the supply chain, we 
break down the inter-firm bullwhip ratio into individual intra-firm bullwhips by following 
the bullwhip effect decomposition framework developed in Chapter 3. This decomposition 
helps one think about the relationships between various information and material flows that 
are involved in a firm’s decision-making process. Figure 4.3 illustrates the framework in a 
two-echelon supply chain: a distributor (downstream) and a manufacturer (upstream). The 
distributor and the manufacturer are denoted as firms D and U, respectively. We organize 
our discussion around the manufacturer. Similar discussion is applicable to the distributor. 
Firm U receives a demand stream (orders from distributor) with variance 𝑉𝐷
𝑈  (the 
superscript refers to firm U, and the subscript D denotes that this is the variance of the 
demand stream). Due to constraints in manufacturing and inventory, firm U may not be 
able to fulfill demands immediately, so its shipment stream may not exactly match its 
demand stream. For example, the anticipation of economic boom causes customers to place 
orders too large to be filled instantly via inventory on hand and/or current manufacturing 
output. Thus, the variance of firm U’s shipment stream denoted by 𝑉𝑆
𝑈 (the superscript 
denotes firm U and the subscript S refer to the shipment) may differ from the variance of 





denote this bullwhip ratio by 𝐵𝑆





𝑈. The shipment bullwhip indicates an 
amplification of the demand stream when 𝐵𝑆
𝑈 > 1 and a smoothing of the demand stream 
when 𝐵𝑆





Firm U’s manufacturing stream will not necessarily match its shipment stream due 
to various factors such as seasonal demand, convex manufacturing cost function, and batch 
manufacturing. For example, suppose firm U faces seasonal demand throughout the year. 
Then the firm may find that it is appropriate to smooth its manufacturing relative to its 
shipment by using finished goods inventory as a buffer with the following results: Produce 
at relatively stable rate, build inventory during periods of low demand, and draw down 
inventory in periods of high demand. In order to recognize the fact that the manufacturing 





𝑈 , where 𝑉𝑀
𝑈  denotes the variance in the manufacturing stream. The manufacturing 
bullwhip may indicate an amplification (𝐵𝑀
𝑈 > 1) or a smoothing (𝐵𝑀
𝑈 < 1).      
Similarly, firm U may find that it is not optimal to order raw materials to exactly 
follow its manufacturing stream due to sales promotion, demand uncertainty, and order 
batching. For example, the firm’s supplier may offer periodic discounts to boost sales or 
liquidate material surpluses. The firm can forward buy and hold raw material inventory to 
save purchase cost, resulting in a volatile order stream compared to manufacturing stream. 







𝑈 denotes the variance in stream of orders that firm U places. 
Again, the order bullwhip may indicate an amplification (𝐵𝑂
𝑈 > 1) or a smoothing (𝐵𝑂
𝑈 <
1 ). For firm D (distributor) that performs no manufacturing, there is no intermediate 
















𝑈. We can write firm U’s full bullwhip ratio as the multiplicative effect of three 
intra-firm component bullwhips, namely shipment bullwhip, manufacturing bullwhip, and 






















Due to data availability issues, some previous studies use a surrogate measure to estimate 
the bullwhip ratio 𝐵𝑈. For example, Cachon et al. (2007) do not have access to the orders 
and therefore use what they call “production” as a proxy for these orders, which is 
calculated as sales plus the change in inventory (i.e., the difference between ending and 
beginning inventory). This production stream represents the inflow of materials (i.e., order 
receipt). For a firm (such as a wholesaler) that performs no manufacturing, the production 
stream is directly equivalent to the inflow of finished goods. Since “production” may have 
various connotations, we will use the term “inflow” (order receipt) to represent the 
production stream and denote the inflow variance by 𝑉𝐼






𝑈 . Note that firm D’s inflow stream is actually shipment stream of firm U, so 
variance of firm D’s inflow stream (𝑉𝐼
𝐷) is equal to variance of firm U’s shipment stream 
(𝑉𝑆
𝑈). Also note that U’s demand stream is equal to D’s order stream, which implies that 
𝑉𝑂
𝐷 = 𝑉𝐷





𝑈 is then used as a surrogate for the bullwhip ratio 𝐵
𝑈 (we 









𝑈 . That is, the proxy bullwhip ratio 𝐵∗
𝑈 is equal to the bullwhip 
ratio 𝐵𝑈 multiplied by the inflow bullwhip. Bray and Mendelson (2012) and Shan et al. 













𝑈 (we use double asterisk in the subscript to denote this bullwhip ratio).    
The above decomposition allows us to consider the bullwhip effect by looking at 
its individual components. For the distributors in our dataset, the shipment stream (i.e., 
sales to customers) is almost equivalent to the demand stream, indicating that 𝐵𝑆
𝐷 = 1. As 
we mentioned before, distributors do not perform manufacturing, so there is no 





𝐷  . In short, the full 
bullwhip ( 𝐵∗
𝐷 ) of a distributor can be written as 𝐵∗
𝐷 = 𝐵𝑂
𝐷 ∗ 𝐵𝐼
𝐷 . Table 4.14 shows 
distributors’ individual intra-firm bullwhips. We find that the majority of SKUs at 
distributors A, B, D, and E have a smoother inflow stream compared to the order stream 
(𝐵𝐼
𝐷 < 1 ). This implies that manufacturer smooths shipment stream relative to demand 
stream, resulting in a dampening effect on the distributor’s full bullwhip. Conversely, most 
SKUs at distributor C and about half SKUs at distributor F have an amplifying inflow 
stream compared to order stream ( 𝐵𝐼
𝐷 > 1 ), indicating that manufacturer’s shipment 
bullwhip amplifies the distributor’s full bullwhip. Manufacturer’s individual intra-firm 
bullwhips are shown in Table 4.15. We find that manufacturer’s shipment stream is 
smoother than its demand stream (𝐵𝑆
𝑈 < 1) and its manufacturing stream is more volatile 
that its shipment stream (𝐵𝑀
𝑈 > 1). Our interview with managers of the manufacturer helps 
explain why the firm exhibits such behaviors: 1) When manufacturer offers distributors 
price discounts, the distributors sometimes place a significant large order. So manufacturer 
will not be able to fulfill orders immediately and have to spread out shipments in the next 





batch manufacturing due to economy of scale, resulting in a more variable manufacturing 
stream compared to the shipment stream.          
 Each SKU contains only one main chemical component and there are a total of four 
main chemical components in our dataset. We denote these components by chemicals A, 
B, L, and M and calculate individual bullwhips for each chemical. The results are shown 
in Table 4.16. Since we are not able to keep track of the raw chemical material usage in the 
actual manufacturing process, we use imputed manufacturing (raw material receipt plus 
change in raw material inventory) for the order bullwhip. Distributors’ order bullwhip is 
greater than one for each chemical. This suggests that distributors amplify demand 
variability. All chemicals at manufacturer have shipment bullwhip less than one, indicating 
that the manufacturer smooths shipment relative to demand. Manufacturer’s order bullwhip 
is greater than one for each chemical. This implies that the manufacturer amplifies orders 
placed to its supplier relative to its manufacturing output. The manufacturing bullwhip is 
positively correlated with the shipment bullwhip and negatively correlated with the order 
bullwhip. The inflow bullwhip is negatively correlated with the order bullwhip.      
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The bullwhip effect is one of the central observations in economics and operations 
management and has drawn much attention from both academia and industry. There has 
been an extensive literature of theoretical studies on the bullwhip effect, but empirical 
studies are still limited due to data availability issues. By using a unique dataset from a 
multiechelon pharmaceutical supply chain, we are able to address several empirical 





particular, we investigate the existence and magnitude of the bullwhip effect at SKU level, 
analyze the impact of data aggregation on the bullwhip measurement, and test a number of 
driving factors of the bullwhip effect.  
 We find that the bullwhip effect at SKU level is prevalent and intensive at 
distributors. Manufacturer (upstream) exhibits a less intensive bullwhip effect than 
distributors (downstream). The manufacturer does not suffer as much as we previously 
thought. But we do observe that the manufacturer has greater demand variance than the 
distributors. We find that the bullwhip ratio based on order variance is higher than that 
based on order receipt variance. The material-based bullwhip measure that is widely used 
in prior empirical studies underestimates the information-based measure. We observe that 
product aggregation and time aggregation tend to mask the bullwhip effect in some cases. 
We find that SKUs that have more predictable demands are more likely to exhibit the 
bullwhip effect. Manufacturer smooths production relative to demand for several SKUs, 
providing empirical support to production smoothing hypothesis. We find that most 
prominent factors related to the bullwhip effect are price variation, order lead time, and 
inventory. 
 Our study has some limitations. First, our data are from a single supply chain and 
for pharmaceutical products. This limits the generalizability of our findings to other 
industries and other types of products. We advocate caution in out-of-sample inferences. 
Second, similar to other empirical research, our study is only able to estimate associations 

























































Table 4.1:  Summary Statistics of the Orders and Sales for Each Distributor 





Sales 9699 20431 2 88510 
Orders 13179 41712 -7 411240 
Distributor B 
Sales 5104 10038 8 43999 
Orders 6321 14241 -22 104860 
Distributor C 
Sales 1969 4781 1 31207 
Orders 2706 6339 -20 63240 
Distributor D 
Sales 2289 4187 -3 16992 
Orders 2969 6534 -225 53000 
Distributor E 
Sales 838 1437 1 5903 
Orders 2055 3592 -13 20800 
Distributor F 
Sales 2008 3556 -160 18660 
Orders 2562 5201 20 45000 
























Table 4.2:  Bullwhip Ratios at SKU Level 
 
  Manufacturer  A B C D E F 
SKU 3 11.17  21.56 8.54 5.38 12.96 12.87 3.95 
SKU 4 15.66  16.28 6.14 26.79 16.96 8.26 1.25 
SKU 5 16.23  10.27 7.80 6.06 29.21 3.87 3.75 
SKU 6 8.37  28.71 8.71 3.35 4.63 4.64 1.68 
SKU 7 7.19  53.90 12.48 7.12 11.23 17.36 2.24 
SKU 8 4.13  28.81 4.51 5.86 9.99 3.06 5.93 
SKU 9 3.13  98.68 13.40 4.83 21.06 35.55 1.89 
SKU 1 0.79  174.54 25.39 19.57 50.77 29.26 7.19 
SKU 2 0.19  216.67 18.42 4.73 34.46 43.54 6.16 
SKU 10 4.86  9.47 14.09 3.87 4.85 5.72 1.83 
SKU 11 2.68  1.48 18.46 3.03 3.14   1.13 
SKU 12 1.56  55.32           
SKU 13 0.74  81.22           
SKU 14 1.29  52.55           
SKU 15 0.13  92.62           
SKU 16 10.08      8.77       
SKU 17 5.11      2.58       
SKU 18 5.77      5.18       
SKU 19 1.43      4.18       
SKU 20 1.48          45.79   
SKU 21 0.89          48.31   
SKU 22 6.30    14.90         
SKU 23 2.33    21.67         
SKU 24 4.16    18.08         
SKU 25 0.43    28.30         
SKU 26 1.58        63.41     
SKU 27 2.79        36.00     
SKU 28 0.70        56.52     
SKU 29 2.89            5.23 
SKU 30 4.15            7.14 
SKU 31 1.08            7.73 
For manufacturer: Bullwhip Ratio = V[Production]/V[Demand] 












Table 4.3:  Bullwhip Ratios Measured by Order Variance and Order Receipt Variance 
 
Distributor A 
  V[Order]/V[Sales]   V[Order Receipt]/V[Sales]   
SKU 3 21.56 18.75 
SKU 4 16.28 14.57 
SKU 5 10.27 8.83 
SKU 6 28.71 24.76 
SKU 7 53.90 36.02 
SKU 8 28.81 19.47 
SKU 9 98.68 63.64 
SKU 1 174.54 67.23 
SKU 2 216.67 92.48 
SKU 10 9.47 11.34 
SKU 11 1.48 1.00 
SKU 12 55.32 31.30 
SKU 13 81.22 30.15 
SKU 14 52.55 32.80 
SKU 15 92.62 24.02 
 
Distributor B 
  V[Order]/V[Sales]   V[Order Receipt]/V[Sales]   
SKU 3 8.54 10.68 
SKU 4 6.14 4.21 
SKU 5 7.80 7.06 
SKU 6 8.71 7.04 
SKU 7 12.48 13.01 
SKU 8 4.51 4.51 
SKU 9 13.40 10.62 
SKU 1 25.39 15.52 
SKU 2 18.42 12.02 
SKU 10 14.09 8.37 
SKU 11 18.46 16.37 
SKU 22 14.90 11.52 
SKU 23 21.67 13.68 
SKU 24 18.08 14.12 










Table 4.3 Continued 
 
Distributor C 
  V[Order]/V[Sales]   V[Order Receipt]/V[Sales]   
SKU 3 5.38 7.55 
SKU 4 26.79 27.46 
SKU 5 6.06 7.41 
SKU 6 3.35 3.86 
SKU 7 7.12 10.53 
SKU 8 5.86 5.86 
SKU 9 4.83 8.97 
SKU 1 19.57 17.80 
SKU 2 4.73 5.70 
SKU 10 3.87 3.81 
SKU 11 3.03 3.03 
SKU 16 8.77 24.47 
SKU 17 2.58 3.04 
SKU 18 5.18 10.08 
SKU 19 4.18 4.21 
 
Distributor D 
  V[Order]/V[Sales]   V[Order Receipt]/V[Sales]   
SKU 3 12.96 7.97 
SKU 4 16.96 10.28 
SKU 5 29.21 24.97 
SKU 6 4.63 4.75 
SKU 7 11.23 7.28 
SKU 8 9.99 8.28 
SKU 9 21.06 13.21 
SKU 1 50.77 29.38 
SKU 2 34.46 19.29 
SKU 10 4.85 3.82 
SKU 11 3.14 5.44 
SKU 26 63.41 39.48 
SKU 27 36.00 21.65 











Table 4.3 Continued 
 
Distributor E 
  V[Order]/V[Sales]   V[Order Receipt]/V[Sales]   
SKU 3 12.87 10.33 
SKU 4 8.26 7.44 
SKU 5 3.87 3.87 
SKU 6 4.64 4.42 
SKU 7 17.36 14.84 
SKU 8 3.06 2.59 
SKU 9 35.55 31.74 
SKU 1 29.26 25.06 
SKU 2 43.54 35.26 
SKU 10 5.72 4.24 
SKU 20 45.79 40.12 
SKU 21 48.31 42.43 
 
Distributor F 
  V[Order]/V[Sales]   V[Order Receipt]/V[Sales]   
SKU 3 3.95 4.68 
SKU 4 1.25 1.28 
SKU 5 3.75 3.98 
SKU 6 1.68 1.31 
SKU 7 2.24 2.59 
SKU 8 5.93 5.79 
SKU 9 1.89 1.92 
SKU 1 7.19 6.87 
SKU 2 6.16 5.64 
SKU 10 1.83 1.82 
SKU 11 1.13 1.21 
SKU 29 5.23 3.09 
SKU 30 7.14 5.28 















Table 4.4:  T-Test Statistics for Bullwhip Ratio Comparison 
 
  T-Test Statistic 
Distributor A 3.00*** 
Distributor B 3.28*** 
Distributor C -2.02 
Distributor D 3.55*** 
Distributor E 3.94*** 
Distributor F 1.51* 









































Table 4.5:  Product Aggregation of Bullwhip Effect 
 
Manufacturer  
  SKU group family 
SKU 15 0.13 0.16 0.16 
SKU 25 0.43 0.16 0.16 
SKU 28 0.70 0.16 0.16 
SKU 21 0.89 0.16 0.16 
SKU 31 1.08 0.16 0.16 
SKU 19 1.43 0.16 0.16 
SKU 9 3.13 0.16 0.16 
SKU 5 16.23 0.16 0.16 
SKU 14 1.29 2.39 0.16 
SKU 27 2.79 2.39 0.16 
SKU 8 4.13 2.39 0.16 
SKU 30 4.15 2.39 0.16 
SKU 24 4.16 2.39 0.16 
SKU 18 5.77 2.39 0.16 
SKU 2 0.19 0.19 0.17 
SKU 1 0.79 0.79 0.17 
SKU 13 0.74 1.06 0.89 
SKU 20 1.48 1.06 0.89 
SKU 26 1.58 1.06 0.89 
SKU 23 2.33 1.06 0.89 
SKU 29 2.89 1.06 0.89 
SKU 17 5.11 1.06 0.89 
SKU 7 7.19 1.06 0.89 
SKU 4 15.66 1.06 0.89 
SKU 12 1.56 4.31 0.89 
SKU 22 6.30 4.31 0.89 
SKU 6 8.37 4.31 0.89 
SKU 16 10.08 4.31 0.89 
SKU 3 11.17 4.31 0.89 
SKU 11 2.68 2.68 4.46 
SKU 10 4.86 4.86 4.46 
For manufacturer: Bullwhip Ratio = V[Production]/V[Demand] 











Table 4.5 Continued 
 
Distributor A 
  SKU group family 
SKU 11 1.48 1.48 4.96 
SKU 10 9.47 9.47 4.96 
SKU 3 21.56 52.66 81.87 
SKU 6 28.71 52.66 81.87 
SKU 12 55.32 52.66 81.87 
SKU 4 16.28 83.25 81.87 
SKU 7 53.90 83.25 81.87 
SKU 13 81.22 83.25 81.87 
SKU 8 28.81 55.52 95.04 
SKU 14 52.55 55.52 95.04 
SKU 5 10.27 94.49 95.04 
SKU 15 92.62 94.49 95.04 
SKU 9 98.68 94.49 95.04 
SKU 1 174.54 174.54 216.97 
SKU 2 216.67 216.67 216.97 
 
Distributor B 
  SKU group family 
SKU 11 18.46 18.46 13.53 
SKU 10 14.09 14.09 13.53 
SKU 3 8.54 10.60 17.80 
SKU 6 8.71 10.60 17.80 
SKU 22 14.90 10.60 17.80 
SKU 4 6.14 19.52 17.80 
SKU 7 12.48 19.52 17.80 
SKU 23 21.67 19.52 17.80 
SKU 2 18.42 18.42 19.23 
SKU 1 25.39 25.39 19.23 
SKU 8 4.51 16.58 26.42 
SKU 24 18.08 16.58 26.42 
SKU 5 7.80 26.64 26.42 
SKU 9 13.40 26.64 26.42 










Table 4.5 Continued 
 
Distributor C 
  SKU group family 
SKU 17 2.58 2.58 2.70 
SKU 7 7.12 2.58 2.70 
SKU 4 26.79 2.58 2.70 
SKU 6 3.35 8.16 2.70 
SKU 3 5.38 8.16 2.70 
SKU 16 8.77 8.16 2.70 
SKU 11 3.03 3.03 2.93 
SKU 10 3.87 3.87 2.93 
SKU 19 4.18 4.17 4.16 
SKU 9 4.83 4.17 4.16 
SKU 5 6.06 4.17 4.16 
SKU 18 5.18 5.18 4.16 
SKU 8 5.86 5.18 4.16 
SKU 2 4.73 4.73 5.33 
SKU 1 19.57 19.57 5.33 
 
Distributor D 
  SKU group family 
SKU 11 3.14 3.14 4.23 
SKU 10 4.85 4.85 4.23 
SKU 2 34.46 34.46 36.12 
SKU 1 50.77 50.77 36.12 
SKU 6 4.63 9.77 50.68 
SKU 3 12.96 9.77 50.68 
SKU 7 11.23 59.42 50.68 
SKU 4 16.96 59.42 50.68 
SKU 26 63.41 59.42 50.68 
SKU 8 9.99 35.72 56.07 
SKU 27 36.00 35.72 56.07 
SKU 9 21.06 55.29 56.07 
SKU 5 29.21 55.29 56.07 











Table 4.5 Continued 
 
Distributor E 
  SKU group family 
SKU 10 5.72 5.72 11.60 
SKU 1 29.26 29.26 41.75 
SKU 2 43.54 43.54 41.75 
SKU 6 4.64 7.36 49.65 
SKU 3 12.87 7.36 49.65 
SKU 4 8.26 50.50 49.65 
SKU 7 17.36 50.50 49.65 
SKU 20 45.79 50.50 49.65 
SKU 8 3.06 3.06 51.29 
SKU 5 3.87 51.26 51.29 
SKU 9 35.55 51.26 51.29 
SKU 21 48.31 51.26 51.29 
 
Distributor F 
  SKU group family 
SKU 11 1.13 1.13 1.67 
SKU 10 1.83 1.83 1.67 
SKU 6 1.68 1.67 3.53 
SKU 3 3.95 1.67 3.53 
SKU 4 1.25 4.68 3.53 
SKU 7 2.24 4.68 3.53 
SKU 29 5.23 4.68 3.53 
SKU 2 6.16 6.16 6.22 
SKU 1 7.19 7.19 6.22 
SKU 8 5.93 5.59 6.81 
SKU 30 7.14 5.59 6.81 
SKU 9 1.89 6.81 6.81 
SKU 5 3.75 6.81 6.81 















Table 4.6:  T-test Statistics for Product Aggregation 
 
  SKU -> Group Group -> Family SKU -> Family 
Manufacturer 3.33*** 3.92*** 4.43*** 
Distributor A -2.52** -2.90*** -3.99*** 
Distributor B -2.14** -1.22 -2.52** 
Distributor C 0.99 2.12** 2.22** 
Distributor D -2.47** -1.29 -3.15*** 
Distributor E -2.25** -2.15** -4.31*** 
Distributor F -1.06 -0.55 -1.54* 








































Table 4.7:  Time Aggregation of Bullwhip Effect 
 
Manufacturer 
  monthly quarterly semi-annual 
SKU 3 11.17 15.55 15.29 
SKU 4 15.66 6.06 5.23 
SKU 5 16.23 4.70 3.39 
SKU 6 8.37 2.90 3.88 
SKU 7 7.19 4.02 6.27 
SKU 8 4.13 2.49 2.72 
SKU 9 3.13 2.01 2.18 
SKU 1 0.79 0.49 0.19 
SKU 2 0.19 0.27 0.20 
SKU 10 4.86 5.02 3.72 
SKU 11 2.68 1.09 0.91 
SKU 12 1.56 1.08 0.65 
SKU 13 0.74 0.35 0.20 
SKU 14 1.29 0.61 0.13 
SKU 15 0.13 0.08 0.03 
SKU 16 10.08 5.34 0.73 
SKU 17 5.11 2.34 1.42 
SKU 18 5.77 1.88 1.44 
SKU 19 1.43 1.04 0.86 
SKU 20 1.48 0.69 2.24 
SKU 21 0.89 0.74 1.88 
SKU 22 6.30 6.36 3.83 
SKU 23 2.33 0.94 0.45 
SKU 24 4.16 4.30 2.08 
SKU 25 0.43 0.41 0.18 
SKU 26 1.58 0.96 0.46 
SKU 27 2.79 0.83 0.49 
SKU 28 0.70 0.97 0.49 
SKU 29 2.89 3.63 2.90 
SKU 30 4.15 3.29 1.96 
SKU 31 1.08 0.87 1.00 
For manufacturer: Bullwhip Ratio = V[Production]/V[Demand] 











Table 4.7 Continued 
 
Distributor A 
  monthly quarterly semi-annual 
SKU 3 21.56 17.56 18.76 
SKU 4 16.28 9.36 6.00 
SKU 5 10.27 15.37 10.62 
SKU 6 28.71 31.05 24.92 
SKU 7 53.90 146.64 137.18 
SKU 8 28.81 26.71 16.84 
SKU 9 98.68 158.95 141.74 
SKU 1 174.54 94.20 61.07 
SKU 2 216.67 330.29 269.14 
SKU 10 9.47 5.23 2.34 
SKU 11 1.48 1.05 0.89 
SKU 12 55.32 117.24 185.44 
SKU 13 81.22 217.06 277.62 
SKU 14 52.55 77.13 106.81 
SKU 15 92.62 175.15 928.13 
 
Distributor B 
  monthly quarterly semi-annual 
SKU 3 8.54 12.49 15.03 
SKU 4 6.14 5.03 3.65 
SKU 5 7.80 1.37 1.68 
SKU 6 8.71 5.88 2.50 
SKU 7 12.48 12.99 6.94 
SKU 8 4.51 4.17 2.46 
SKU 9 13.40 4.68 2.41 
SKU 1 25.39 10.24 6.65 
SKU 2 18.42 5.59 3.59 
SKU 10 14.09 5.60 3.29 
SKU 11 18.46 10.18 7.19 
SKU 22 14.90 11.64 9.02 
SKU 23 21.67 23.18 31.13 
SKU 24 18.08 8.88 5.52 










Table 4.7 Continued 
 
Distributor C 
  monthly quarterly semi-annual 
SKU 3 5.38 2.52 3.56 
SKU 4 26.79 30.17 38.52 
SKU 5 6.06 4.49 2.78 
SKU 6 3.35 3.71 3.48 
SKU 7 7.12 11.38 4.75 
SKU 8 5.86 3.68 1.08 
SKU 9 4.83 3.55 2.59 
SKU 1 19.57 16.15 18.11 
SKU 2 4.73 4.81 3.98 
SKU 10 3.87 2.53 3.73 
SKU 11 3.03 1.29 1.27 
SKU 16 8.77 10.13 9.42 
SKU 17 2.58 3.08 2.71 
SKU 18 5.18 5.34 3.53 
SKU 19 4.18 3.38 3.22 
 
Distributor D 
  monthly quarterly semi-annual 
SKU 3 12.96 23.49 52.13 
SKU 4 16.96 64.16 53.02 
SKU 5 29.21 32.23 25.92 
SKU 6 4.63 2.38 1.64 
SKU 7 11.23 10.70 13.43 
SKU 8 9.99 14.50 14.35 
SKU 9 21.06 21.55 28.16 
SKU 1 50.77 108.39 95.96 
SKU 2 34.46 107.20 111.42 
SKU 10 4.85 2.96 2.73 
SKU 11 3.14 1.01 0.55 
SKU 26 63.41 164.58 110.51 
SKU 27 36.00 64.82 56.97 











Table 4.7 Continued 
 
Distributor E 
  monthly quarterly semi-annual 
SKU 3 12.87 3.48 2.81 
SKU 4 8.26 10.44 31.86 
SKU 5 3.87 1.50 1.51 
SKU 6 4.64 1.88 1.68 
SKU 7 17.36 21.61 10.13 
SKU 8 3.06 4.78 4.18 
SKU 9 35.55 30.61 7.81 
SKU 1 29.26 8.53 1.09 
SKU 2 43.54 21.00 3.04 
SKU 10 5.72 1.85 2.00 
SKU 20 45.79 32.08 11.64 
SKU 21 48.31 24.09 23.32 
 
Distributor F 
  monthly quarterly semi-annual 
SKU 3 3.95 3.16 8.05 
SKU 4 1.25 2.11 2.06 
SKU 5 3.75 2.35 1.80 
SKU 6 1.68 2.37 2.22 
SKU 7 2.24 1.76 1.14 
SKU 8 5.93 2.47 1.13 
SKU 9 1.89 2.12 1.61 
SKU 1 7.19 6.25 4.16 
SKU 2 6.16 4.90 3.06 
SKU 10 1.83 1.83 1.92 
SKU 11 1.13 0.68 1.08 
SKU 29 5.23 6.62 6.64 
SKU 30 7.14 6.59 6.01 
























Manufacturer 2.87*** 2.04*** 3.28*** 
Distributor A -2.17** -1 -1.46* 
Distributor B 2.22** 1.99** 3.18*** 
Distributor C 0.61 0.29 0.6 
Distributor D -2.95*** 1.26 -3.09*** 
Distributor E 2.78*** 1.45* 2.48** 
Distributor F 0.94 0.99 1.44* 







































Table 4.9:  Bullwhip Ratios along the Supply Chain 
 
  Distributors A-F Manufacturer Supply Chain 
SKU 3 11.36 11.17 126.90 
SKU 4 2.62 15.66 40.97 
SKU 5 7.63 16.23 123.84 
SKU 6 5.12 8.37 42.81 
SKU 7 18.37 7.19 132.17 
SKU 8 6.6 4.13 27.30 
SKU 9 6.15 3.13 19.26 
SKU 1 88.51 0.79 70.12 
SKU 2 80.18 0.19 15.46 
SKU 10 7.39 4.86 35.93 
SKU 11 1.47 2.68 3.94 
SKU 12 55.32 1.56 86.55 
SKU 13 81.22 0.74 59.97 
SKU 14 52.55 1.29 67.96 
SKU 15 92.62 0.13 12.35 
SKU 16 8.77 10.08 88.39 
SKU 17 2.58 5.11 13.20 
SKU 18 5.18 5.77 29.94 
SKU 19 4.18 1.43 5.96 
SKU 20 45.79 1.48 67.77 
SKU 21 48.31 0.89 43.09 
SKU 22 14.9 6.3 93.95 
SKU 23 21.67 2.33 50.41 
SKU 24 18.08 4.16 75.14 
SKU 25 28.3 0.43 12.04 
SKU 26 63.41 1.58 100.32 
SKU 27 36 2.79 100.34 
SKU 28 56.52 0.7 39.70 
SKU 29 5.23 2.89 15.11 
SKU 30 7.14 4.15 29.62 
SKU 31 7.73 1.08 8.35 
T Statistics 5.3*** 4.14*** 7.49*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For manufacturer: Bullwhip Ratio = V[Production]/V[Demand] 
For distributors A-F: Bullwhip Ratio = V[Order]/V[Sales] 








Table 4.10:  Estimation Results 
 























                              Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                              *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                              Bullwhip Ratio = V[Order]/V[Sales] 
 
 
Table 4.11:  Correlation between Coefficient of Variation of Demand and Bullwhip Ratio 
 
 Correlation 
Distributor A -0.38 
Distributor B -0.30 
Distributor C -0.31 
Distributor D -0.48* 
Distributor E -0.80** 
Distributor F -0.54* 
                           *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








Table 4.12:  Correlation between Lead Time and Bullwhip Ratio 
 
 Correlation 
Distributor A 0.54** 
Distributor B 0.44 
Distributor C -0.36 
Distributor D 0.09 
Distributor E 0.06 
Distributor F -0.24 
            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            Bullwhip Ratio = V[Order]/V[Sales] 
 
 
Table 4.13:  Correlation between Inventory Ratio and Bullwhip Ratio 
 
 Correlation 
Distributor A -0.47* 
Distributor B 0.10 
Distributor C 0.44 
Distributor D -0.65** 
Distributor E -0.49 
Distributor F -0.51* 
                           *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
























Table 4.14:  Distributors’ Intra-Firm Bullwhips 
 





SKU 3 18.75 21.56 0.87 
SKU 4 14.57 16.28 0.89 
SKU 5 8.83 10.27 0.86 
SKU 6 24.76 28.71 0.86 
SKU 7 36.02 53.90 0.67 
SKU 8 19.47 28.81 0.68 
SKU 9 63.64 98.68 0.64 
SKU 1 67.23 174.54 0.39 
SKU 2 92.48 216.67 0.43 
SKU 10 11.34 9.47 1.20 
SKU 11 1.00 1.48 0.68 
SKU 12 31.30 55.32 0.57 
SKU 13 30.15 81.22 0.37 
SKU 14 32.80 52.55 0.62 
SKU 15 24.02 92.62 0.26 
 





SKU 3 10.68 8.54 1.25 
SKU 4 4.21 6.14 0.69 
SKU 5 7.06 7.80 0.91 
SKU 6 7.04 8.71 0.81 
SKU 7 13.01 12.48 1.04 
SKU 8 4.51 4.51 1.00 
SKU 9 10.62 13.40 0.79 
SKU 1 15.52 25.39 0.61 
SKU 2 12.02 18.42 0.65 
SKU 10 8.37 14.09 0.59 
SKU 11 16.37 18.46 0.89 
SKU 22 11.52 14.90 0.77 
SKU 23 13.68 21.67 0.63 
SKU 24 14.12 18.08 0.78 








Table 4.14 Continued 
 





SKU 3 7.55 5.38 1.40 
SKU 4 27.46 26.79 1.03 
SKU 5 7.41 6.06 1.22 
SKU 6 3.86 3.35 1.15 
SKU 7 10.53 7.12 1.48 
SKU 8 5.86 5.86 1.00 
SKU 9 8.97 4.83 1.86 
SKU 1 17.80 19.57 0.91 
SKU 2 5.70 4.73 1.20 
SKU 10 3.81 3.87 0.98 
SKU 11 3.03 3.03 1.00 
SKU 16 24.47 8.77 2.79 
SKU 17 3.04 2.58 1.18 
SKU 18 10.08 5.18 1.94 
SKU 19 4.21 4.18 1.01 
 





SKU 3 7.97 12.96 0.61 
SKU 4 10.28 16.96 0.61 
SKU 5 24.97 29.21 0.85 
SKU 6 4.75 4.63 1.03 
SKU 7 7.28 11.23 0.65 
SKU 8 8.28 9.99 0.83 
SKU 9 13.21 21.06 0.63 
SKU 1 29.38 50.77 0.58 
SKU 2 19.29 34.46 0.56 
SKU 10 3.82 4.85 0.79 
SKU 11 5.44 3.14 1.74 
SKU 26 39.48 63.41 0.62 
SKU 27 21.65 36.00 0.60 








Table 4.14 Continued 
 





SKU 3 10.33 12.87 0.80 
SKU 4 7.44 8.26 0.90 
SKU 5 3.87 3.87 1.00 
SKU 6 4.42 4.64 0.95 
SKU 7 14.84 17.36 0.85 
SKU 8 2.59 3.06 0.84 
SKU 9 31.74 35.55 0.89 
SKU 1 25.06 29.26 0.86 
SKU 2 35.26 43.54 0.81 
SKU 10 4.24 5.72 0.74 
SKU 20 40.12 45.79 0.88 
SKU 21 42.43 48.31 0.88 
 





SKU 3 4.68 3.95 1.18 
SKU 4 1.28 1.25 1.02 
SKU 5 3.98 3.75 1.06 
SKU 6 1.31 1.68 0.78 
SKU 7 2.59 2.24 1.15 
SKU 8 5.79 5.93 0.98 
SKU 9 1.92 1.89 1.01 
SKU 1 6.87 7.19 0.96 
SKU 2 5.64 6.16 0.92 
SKU 10 1.82 1.83 1.00 
SKU 11 1.21 1.13 1.07 
SKU 29 3.09 5.23 0.59 
SKU 30 5.28 7.14 0.74 














𝑈       𝐵𝑀
𝑈  
SKU 3 0.84 13.31 
SKU 4 0.76 20.71 
SKU 5 0.85 19.16 
SKU 6 0.76 10.95 
SKU 7 0.76 9.45 
SKU 8 0.91 4.53 
SKU 9 0.81 3.88 
SKU 1 0.40 1.99 
SKU 2 0.48 0.40 
SKU 10 0.74 6.56 
SKU 11 0.85 3.15 
SKU 12 0.57 2.76 
SKU 13 0.37 1.99 
SKU 14 0.62 2.07 
SKU 15 0.26 0.51 
SKU 16 2.79 3.61 
SKU 17 1.18 4.34 
SKU 18 1.94 2.97 
SKU 19 1.01 1.42 
SKU 20 0.88 1.69 
SKU 21 0.88 1.02 
SKU 22 0.77 8.16 
SKU 23 0.63 3.69 
SKU 24 0.78 5.32 
SKU 25 0.42 1.02 
SKU 26 0.62 2.54 
SKU 27 0.60 4.63 
SKU 28 0.45 1.55 
SKU 29 0.59 4.90 
SKU 30 0.74 5.61 

















Order Bullwhip Shipment Bullwhip Manufacturing Bullwhip Order Bullwhip Inflow Bullwhip
Chemical A 85.13 0.46 0.37 3.38 0.29
Chemical B 8.23 0.74 6.57 1.08 1.03
Chemical L 77.65 0.33 0.48 7.46 0.12
Chemical M 49.71 0.46 1.98 6.36 0.25
Shipment vs. Manufacturing Manufacturing vs. Order Order vs. Inflow
Correlation 0.94 -0.73 -0.88







We analytically show how bullwhip ratios change under data aggregation in a two-product 
case.  
Product 𝑋: order 𝑂𝑥 = {𝑂𝑥1 , 𝑂𝑥2 , … , 𝑂𝑥𝑛}; demand 𝑆𝑥 = {𝑆𝑥1 , 𝑆𝑥2 , … , 𝑆𝑥𝑛}    
Product 𝑌: order 𝑂𝑦 = {𝑂𝑦1 , 𝑂𝑦2 , … , 𝑂𝑦𝑛}; demand 𝑆𝑥 = {𝑆𝑦1 , 𝑆𝑦2 , … , 𝑆𝑦𝑛}     
𝑍  is the one aggregated over products 𝑋  and 𝑌 : order 𝑂𝑧 = {𝑂𝑥1 + 𝑂𝑦1 , 𝑂𝑥2 +
















𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑂𝑥) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑂𝑦) + 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑂𝑥, 𝑂𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆𝑥) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆𝑦) + 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑆𝑥, 𝑆𝑦)
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